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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
STEPHEN HAYS ESTAT,E, Inc., 
a corporation of Utah, JULIA 
HAYS HOGE, STEPHEN J. 
HAYS, LAWRENCE .J. HAY8, 
MRS. LOU GOREY, MRS. ETHEL 
V. REILLEY and MARY LOUISE 
O'DONNELL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
5302 
Respondent's Brief 
I 
STATEMENT 
Plaintiff is the owner of extensive mining proper-
ties in Bingham Canyon, in ,Salt Lake County, Utah, 
1 
and is engaged in operating them as an open-cut mme. 
By the complaint in this cause it is alleged that plain-
tiff must remove from its mining claims large quantities 
of low-grade ores or overburden whereby to disclose the 
commercial orcs below and make them available for 
mining and shipment; that the low-grade ores or over-
burden so removed must be dumped upon the surface of 
adjacent lands in gulches or depressions in close proxi-
mity to the mining claims from which they were taken 
and from which the commercial ores arc to be extracted; 
that plaintiff had accordingly dumped immense quantities 
of such material upon a large aroa in Dixon Gulch own-
ed in fee by plaintiff, and that that material contained 
small quantities of copper in carbonate and sulphide 
form, in the aggregate amounting to many millions of 
pounds; that such copper becomes soluble in water after 
having been exposed to the action of the air and meteoric 
waters; that the dumps in Dixon Gulch, like all the 
others of similar material, due to the accumulation of 
snow and the rain falling upon them, collect, retain and 
become saturated with moisture, retard and equalize the 
run-off, and a portion of the copper in the dumps is held 
in solution in the waters within, and percolating through 
the dumps, and such copper so held in those solutions 
may be precipitated and recovered commercially. It 
was further alleged in the complaint that before the 
copper could be precipitated from the solutions, the 
latter must be collected and conveyed through pipe lines 
2 
to a precipitating plant plaintiff had constructed for 
that purpose. 
Dixon Gulch is funnel-shaped, widening at the top 
and becoming very narrow as the gulch nears the bot-
tom of Bingham Canyon, and it has an average slope 
of 26 per cent. (Tr. 166.) Plaintiff is the owner in 
fee of that part of Dixon Gulch where its dumps are, 
and thence upwards to the top of the watershed. Im-
mediately below the dumps is the Bingham & Garfield 
Railway fill, only partially upon defendants' property 
and which occupies the space between plaintiff's dumps 
in Dixon Gulch and the point on bedrock in Tract C 
where the plaintiff diverts the solutions with which we 
are here concerned into plaintiff's pipe line and thence 
to plaintiff's precipitating plant. Almost the whole of 
the surface of this area between plaintiff's dumps and 
plaintiff's intake is occupied exclusively by the Bingham 
& Garfield Railway Company for its railroad purposes, 
for the most part upon land whereof plaintiff is the 
owner of the fee, the remainder in part under a decree 
of condemnation and in part by conveyance from the 
defendants' predecessor in interest. The copper solu-
tions, however, continue on down the gulch on and 
above bedrock through and beneath the railroad fill to 
plaintiff's intake on Tract C, where they enter plain-
tiff's pipe lines and are conveyed some distance down 
Bingham Canyon to plaintiff's precipitating plant. The 
railway company's easements across that part of Dixon 
Gulch between plaintiff's property and plaintiff's intake 
are for railroad purposes and do not include the right 
to convey over that area these copper solutions for 
mining purposes, and because the defendants declined to 
grant to plaintiff the right to convey these solutions 
across this tract through and under the railroad fill, 
plaintiff, to preserve its property in the solutions and 
the copper they contain, was compelled to insti,tute this 
suit to condemn that right, subject to the railway com-
pany's easements, limiting its use to the surface in its 
natural condition, without any right to enter or pene-
trate beneath the surface or to disturb the condition of 
the surface. By a wribing introduced in evidence in this 
case (Exhibit 11, Tr. 60) Bingham & Garfield Railway 
Company consented, so far as its interest permitted it 
to consent, to plaintiff's use and occupation of this sur-
face for that purpose. 
Plaintiff's intake was constructed upon Tract C 
and consists of a short tunnel driven just beneath the 
top of bedrock, from the face of which branches are 
constructed to the right and left that penetrate up-
wards through the top of bedrock and into the rail-
way fill, thus intercepting all the copper solutions as 
they flow down the gulch on and above bedrock from 
plaintiff's dumps. Tract A is for a pipe line that con-
veys similar copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps 
farther up Bingham Canyon. Tract B is for a portion of 
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a pipe line that conveys 'to plaintiff's precipitating plant 
the solutions carried by the pipe line in Tract A, as well a's 
those from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch intercepted 
at plaintiff's intake on Tract C. The remaining tract 
condemned was Tract G, for the construction and oper-
ation of an electric transmission line. When it came 
to the proof, defendants did not contest the condemna-
tion of Tracts A, B and C except wherein Tracts B 
and C were to be used for the purpose of collecting 
and conveying away that part of the copper solutions 
in Dixon Gulch that flow through the railroad fill near 
the toe thereof at a point the defendants have named 
the "Hays Spring." But Tracts B and C are required 
for the collection, diversion and conveying away of the 
copper solutions in Dixon Gulch the defendants concede 
to the plaintiff, so on the proof rle.fendants do not 
contest plaintiff's condemnation of ·any of Tracts A, 
B or C. Defendants do not contest the condemnation 
of Tract G. Accordingly we are concerned upon this 
appeal only with plaintiff's right to condemn Tract D. 
With the filing of the complaint there was instituted 
a very simple condemnation suit for purposes within 
the express provision of the statute. But by their 
several answers the defendants set up a novel defense. 
The defendants alleged in their answers that while title 
to the copper solutions produced by plaintiff's dumps 
was in plaintiff when on and within plaintiff's property, 
that when those solutions had sunk into the earth and 
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passed from plaintiff's property and been commingled 
with the waters within adjacent property and the sub-
terranean waters of the earth, and had become lost, 
that then they ceased longer to be the property of 
plaintiff and became the property of the defendants 
when upon or within the defendants' property-which 
is a conclusion of law we are not inclined to dispute. 
But defendants further alleged that defendants owned 
the lower extremity of Dixon Gulch wherein is located 
rrract D, and that defendants' property had within it 
valuable copper waters, much of which arose therein 
in the form of springs flowing the year round, and 
that such copper waters had existed therein from time 
immemorial; that defendants' property was highly min-
eralized with valuable ores containing copper and other 
minerals, beneath which were springs, which, together 
with waters from rain and melting snow and waters per-
colating in the defendants' property from the surround-
ing country, took up, absorbed and leached out, the cop-
per values in such copper-bearing ores in place; "that 
great quantities of the waters containing copper in 
solution upon defendants' property in said gulch owned 
by defendants arise to the surface in the form of springs 
thereon,'' and that it was defendants' purpose to collect 
those waters and themselves precipitate the copper there-
from for defendants' own use and disposition. Accord-
ingly the defendants prayed that plaintiff's complaint 
be dismissed, because the law gave plaintiff no right 
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to condemn easements over defendants' property to fa-
cilitate plaintiff's appropriation of defendants' copper 
waters, or in lieu of such dismissal, that the defendants 
have judgment for the value of the copper waters they 
claimed, which value they alleged was "upwards of 
$200,000.00.'' 
The case came on for trial and the court below, 
the late Morris L. Ritchie sitting, upon plaintiff's ob-
jection refused to impanel a jury until the plaintiff's 
right to condemn had been determined, and accordingly 
the parties proceeded with their proof upon the prelim-
inary conditions stated in § 7333 Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917 as follows: 
''Conditions precedent to condemnation. Be-
fore property can be taken it must appear: 
"1. That the use to which it is to be ap-
plied is a use authorized by law; 
"2. That the taking is necessary to such 
use. 
"3. If already appropriated to some pub-
lic use, that the public use to which it is to be 
applied is a more necessary public use.'' 
Defendants excepted to the court's ruling because 
they were thereby deprived of a jury trial upon the 
question of title to the copper solutions, an issue that 
defendants' counsel insisted was ''the paramount issue 
here" ( Tr. 15.) Defendants persisted in their refusal 
to admit the obvious characteristics of this condemna-
7 
tion suit. Defendants refused, and they apparently 
still refuse, to recognize the fact that plaintiff does not 
seek by this action to acquire any copper solutions it 
does not own, and accordingly plaintiff cannot by this 
action be made to respond in damages by way of a 
purchase price for copper solutions, if any, of which 
defendants are the owners. Were it to have been found 
that defendants instead of plaintiff owned the copper 
solutions plainti'ff sought to convey over the easements 
across Tracts A, B, C and D condemned in this ac-
tion, then this suit would have been dismissed, but de-
fendants' concessions on the proof deprived them of 
that defense. Defendants' persistent failure to appre-
ciate the purpose of this suit, and instead to inject into 
the issues that of title to the copper solutions and the 
value ther,eof as an element of damages to be recovered 
by defendants herein, is responsible for the excessive 
length of the record and the immense amount of time 
consumed in the trial of these preliminary issues. Plain-
tiff's case was covered by a trifling number of pages 
of testimony. For instance, its direct examination of 
plaintiff's witness Earl (Tr. 30 to 62) covered thirty-
three pages of the transcript, but this witness was sub-
jected to a eros's examination (Tr. 63 to 168) of one 
hundred six pages. The plaintiff's direct examination 
of its witness H. C. Goodrich (Tr. 290 to 310) covered 
nineteen pages, but this witness was subjected to a 
cross examination (Tr. 310 to 412) of one hundred two 
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pages; all for the obvious purpose of putting on de-
fendants' case through plaintiff's witnesses. There are 
nearly four thousand pages of testimony in this oase, 
the whole of which relates only to the issue of title 
to the copper solutions. Not one pag,e of that record 
is directed to the issue of damages, the ultimate 
issue in a condemnation suit. The parties stipu-
lated to the damage sustained by the defendants for the 
value of the easements condemned and damages result-
ing to the balance of the tract by reason of the taking, 
at the sum of $500.00, the amount offered defendants 
by plaintiff before this suit was begun. (Tr. :3874). 
The defendants appealed because the court below allow-
ed them nothing for the copper solutions, finding that 
the plaintiff and not the defendants was the owner 
of those solutions. While the suit as instituted was a 
condemnation suit, the parties stipulated the only item 
of damages for which judgment could have been entered 
in that suit. This prolonged controversy revolves about 
one issue only, i. e., in whom is the title to the copper 
solutions. Defendants could with greater propriety 
have sought the relief they desired by suit to enjoin 
plaintiff's diversion of copper solutions of which de-
fendants claimed to be the owners. This has, in our 
opinion, a conclusive bearing upon plaintiff's right to 
its costs incurred in the trial below, and will be agam 
referred to in the discussion of that issue. 
When the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company 
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constructed its railroad across Dixon Gulch something 
more than twenty years ago, certain of its engineers 
feared that with the occurrenoe of cloud-bursts, the tor-
rents rushing down that gulch might wash out the rail-
road fill, notwiths,tanding the open and drain-like char-
'acter of its construction, so to provide an abundant 
factor of safety, a drain tunnel was driven through 
the solid rock beneath the right of way, both portals 
of which were in Dixon Gulch on the northerly side, 
the upper above, the lower below the railroad fill, and 
from the upper portal a flume was construct•ed around 
the northerly side of the gulch above the fill by which 
to intercept a part of the run-off from above and divert 
it through the drain tunnel again into Dixon Gulch, but 
below the fill. With the making of plaintiff's dumps in 
Dixon Gulch, extending from high up in the drainage 
area down to and against the railroad fill, all danger 
from cloud-bursts ceased, for the dumps, like a 
sponge or reservoir, absorb such prrecipitation, however 
torrential, and release it so gradually as to cause no 
damag·e. But as plaintiff's dumps gradually became 
satu!'lated with the water·s accumulated from precipita-
tion upon them, a part of those waters followed the 
flume or channel constructed along the northerly side 
of Dixon Gulch to the upper portal of the drain tun-
nel, thence through the drain tunnel and out the east-
erly or lower portal, thence over the railroad fill and 
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into plaintiff's intake on Tract C. When it became 
apparent in the course of the trial below that the de-
fendants were claiming every little pool of copper water 
on the surface that had spilled over from the drain 
tunnel, plaintiff piped that part of the copper solutions 
from the drain tunnel to its int'a]{,e on Tract C, whereby 
to dry up the little pools of copper water that had been 
created by the ·Spilling of the solutions from the easterly 
portal of the drain tunnel. Defendants apparently do 
not daim any of the copper solutions that flow through 
the drain tunnel and thence into plaintiff's intake. 
Their effort has been so concentrated upon the other 
flow in the bottom of the gulch denominated the "Hays 
Spring" that one may lose sight of the fact that au 
equally large flow comes out of the drain tunnel, is 
intercepted in the same intake and diverted and con-
veyed away through the same pipe lines for which a 
right of way has been condemned in this action. Wben, 
therefore, mention is made of Dixon Gulch waters, title 
to which is claimed by the defendants, it is only the so-
called "Hays Spring" copper solutions that are re-
ferred to. 
H must be further borne in mind that it is not the 
contention of either party that any of the waters of 
Dixon Gulch are public waters or capable of appropri-
ation. What little water ther~e was in Dixon Gulch be-
fore the making of plaintiff'.s dumps there, plaintiff 
acquired by arrangement with Jerome Bourgard and 
11 
J. W. Oddie, the original appropriators. The defend-
ants never claimed any right to any of the waters of 
Dixon Gulch by reason of appropri1ation or the devotion 
thereof to any beneficial use. The defendants frankly 
admit that it is not the waters they want, but that in-
ste,ad it is only the copper content in those waters that 
is of value, and the copper only is the thing to which 
they are trying to establish title. The defendants em-
ploy the waters only as a. conveni,ent vehicle for that 
purpose, tre-ating the copper solutions as percolating 
water rather than as the product of plaintiff's industry. 
Their whole case is ,an effort inaccurately to apply to 
the copper solutions here involved the law of percolat-
ing waters whereby to def,eat plaintiff's effort to pro-
t,ect its property in these solutions produced by plain-
tiff's industry and investment, and if successful, them-
selv,es to acquire the fruits of plaintiff's effort and dis-
covery without contribution of any character on the 
part of the,se defendants. 
We here insert a copy of plaintiff's Exhibit 19, 
which is a photograph taken fvom an airplane of plain-
tiff's mine and a part of its many dumps from which 
copper solutions flow and are collected, diverted and 
conv,eyed away t1o plaintiff's precipitating plant. The 
canyon in the middle of the photograph is Bingham Can-
you, branching to the right into Carr Fork and to the 
lef>t into Upper Bingham. Plaintiff's mine is an amphi-
theatre in appearance, and occupies the upper central 
12 

portion of the photograph. Certain of the dumps of 
overburden and low-grade copper ores removed from the 
mine al"e shown on each side of the mine, and the names 
of the several gulches in which those dumps have been 
deposited are indicated by initials in red. For instance, 
on the right side of the photograph the first dump from 
the bottom is Dixon Gulch and is so indicated. The 
gulch at the bottom of the photograph, immediately 
below Dixon Gulch, is Markham Gulch, into which 
dumping had not been started when the photograph 
was taken. The dump in Dixon Gulch was then in its 
fir~st stages merely, but the photograph shows clearly 
the enormous capacity of Dixon Gulch for the further 
dumping of materia'l there. It 'also shows the extent of 
the Dixon Gulch watershed, its broad expanse at the 
higher ~elevations, its exceedingly narrow mouth near 
the bottom of Bingham Canyon at plaintiff's intake, and 
the very steep grade (an average gmde of 26 per cent) 
traveled by the copper solutions made within the dumps 
and intercepted by plaintiff's intake at the toe of the 
railroad fill. The easterly boundary line of plaintiff's 
property in Dixon Gulch is the westerly boundary of 
the def,endants' property, and S'trikes across the gulch 
at a point easterly of the railroad tracks and somewhat 
down the easterly s1ope of the fill, as delineated on the 
photograph by the white line, which shows the relatively 
small portion of the railroad fill upon the defendants' 
property. One looks to the south when looking at the 
13 
photograph; to the right is west, to the left east. The 
plaintiff is the owner in fee of the whole of Dixon 
Gulch from plaintiff's easterly boundary to the very 
top of the Dixon Gulch watershed, and hence plaintiff 
is the owner in fee of the entire area upon which the 
Dixon Gulch dumps and the greater portion of the 
railroad Wl are located. 
II 
ARGUMENT 
(A) 
Point 
By this action plaintiff seeks to condemn merely an ease-
ment to conduct across Tract D into plaintiff's intake on 
Tract C a part of the copper solutions originating in and flow-
ing from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, of both which 
dumps and solutions plaintiff is the owner. By the exercise 
of the easements condemned only such solutions will be inter-
cepted or diverted. There are not now nor were there at any 
other time any other copper waters or solutions arising upon 
or flowing or existing within either Tracts C or D. 
(1) 
Point 
The lay testimony upon the fact capable of observation 
and observed. 
It is the alleged copper solutions of this V'agabond 
thing the defendants have erroneously termed the "Hays 
Spring" that are the bone of contention in this contro-
versy. That is not a spring. The waters flowing down 
Dixon Gulch after the construction of the railroad fill 
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of course passed through the fill and emerged from the 
downward slope of the fill, but we know of no defini-
tion that would permit us to term that a spring. Water 
emerged from the milroad fill whenever ther~e was any 
water flowing down Dixon Gulch because it could not 
do anything else. The point at whioh that water emerg-
ed was the situs of what the defendants term a "spring," 
but the location of that spring changed with the chang-
ing downhill slope of the fil'l. Ever since 1910 the bot-
'tom of Dixon Gulch has been covered by the railroad 
fill, whioh has been enlarged upon certain ocoasions, 
each time covering a greater area in the bottom of the 
gulch, but with the possible exception of the defendant 
Stephen Hays, no witness has been produced who testi-
fied he ever saw a spring in the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
either before or after the construction of the railroad 
fill, either at the present loca:tion of this "Hays Spring" 
or at any other l'ocation within the defendants' prop-
erty up or down Dixon Gulch. 
Defendants state at page 4 of their brief that 
''Most of the surface waters and much of the under-
ground waters in Bingham have for many years shown 
copper content. * * * For a number of years both 
the defendant and its predecessors * * * have sampled 
the waters in Dixon Gulch with a view of ascertaining 
whether it would pay to treat these waters for copper.'' 
'l_1hcre is no evidence in this case upon which to sub-
stantiate this s1tatement. On the contrary, the evidence is 
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that the only waters in Bingham Canyon that have a 
copper content are those issuing from the plaintiff's 
dumps. rrhere is no evidence to indicate the defendants 
knew the waters of Dixon Gulch contained copper before 
plaintiff entered upon its negotiations for the ease-
ments condemned. 
The whole purpose of defendants' case wherein 
weeks were consumed was to prove that there was a 
spring, within the correc't definition of such, upon Tract 
D, and that the copper solutions, except tho·se flowing 
through the drain tunnel, were supplied by that spring, 
and that inasmuch as a spring is a part of the realty 
and hence owned by ·the owners of the fee, that part 
of these copper solutions is the property of the defend-
ants, and that therein the plaintiff has neither interest 
nor title. Defendants failed miserably in their effort 
and have now apparently abandoned their case with 
the statement that it makes no difference from where 
the copper solutions come, hecause the copper solutions 
at the Hays Spring belong to the defendants anyway, 
putting themselves just where they were upon their 
motion for a non-suit at the conculsion of the plain-
tiff's case very early in this proce,eding, a motion 
.T udge Ritchie unqualifiedly denied .after some two days 
of argument and deliberation. This geo'logic fantasy of 
the Hays Spring was a cr·eature of the defendants' in-
genuity, and certainly at the time of trial the defendants 
thoug·ht it vital to their case, or they would have re-
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frained fr~om so expensiv'e an experiment. It is our 
opinion defendants were correct in their first oonception 
of the necessities of their case-proof of the existence of 
the Hays Spring was vital to their case. An issue of such 
importance is not to be disposed of by a mere assertion 
of the fact without any effort whatever to substantiate 
it, accompanied by the statement merely that it makes 
no difference whether the f.act be true or false. We 
construe that assertion as an abandonment of their case, 
but lest this court shall not construe it such, we have 
concluded it our duty to review the testimony upon 
which the court below found against ~the defendants. 
The def,endant Stephen J. Hays ~testified as follows: 
(Tr. 928). 
I can't say that I or my family ever made 
any use of the water's of Dixon Gulch. I never 
used any of the waters in that gulch nor did my 
father to my knowledge. We have no use for the 
waters now; it is the copper in the waters that 
we seek. 
Such being the avowed purpose of thes~e defendants, 
one's immediate effort in determining the source of the 
copper waters is to a~scertain whether or rrot there were 
any copper waters in Dixon Gulch before the railroad 
fill and the plaintiff's dumps were made there; and 
with relation to the Hays Springs, to ascertain whether 
or not before the construction of the railroad fill there 
was a spring on Tract D when the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
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was free from obstruction. The railroad fill was made in 
1910, broadened in 1914, and plaintiff began dumping 
in Dixon Gulch in J,anuary of 1D:26. Accordingly plain-
tiff called to the witness stand men who had lived in 
Bingham and were acquainted with Dixon Gulch and 
the water occurrences there before 1910. 
Among such witnesses was Dr. A. L. Inglesby, who 
practiced his profession of dentistry in Bingham from 
1899 until 1920, married a daughter of Mr. Jerome 
Bourg'ard, who for many years lived and operated a 
. 
butcher shop in the immediate vicinity of the mouth of 
Dixon Gulch. Dr. Ingles by's knowledge of Dixon Gulch 
and the water occurrences there prior to 1910 was pos-
itive and precise, corroborated by nothing less than 
three interesting photographs taken by or of him some 
time between 1899 and 1906. (Ex. 31 and 3:2, 30 and 33, 
and 34 and 35.) Exhibit 30 was t~aken in the narrow 
mouth of Dixon Gulch that is now covered by the rail-
road fill and at a point below where the Hays Spring 
is supposed to be. (Tr. 528-9). 'l'he bottom of the 
gulch appearing in that photograph and from there on 
up the gulch three hundred feet or more to certain 
placer workings was on barren solid rock. (Tr. 534). 
Exhibit 30 was taken in the summer. Dr. Inglesby 
called aUention on Exhibits 31 and 32 to a shadow-
like structure on a ledge appearing in the upper center 
of the photograph upon which he placed a cross in red, 
and wrote the word ''tank.'' He described that tank 
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as one into which the waters of Dixon Gulch were di-
verted from a point some three hundred feet up the 
gulch just below the placer workings, and conveyed from 
tha:t tank into 'Mr. Bourgard 's home, butcher shop and 
into the Bingham Hotel for drinking, cooking and all 
other culinary uses; and the witness recalled that Mr. 
Bourgard watered some ten head of horses from these 
waters (Tr. 535 to 538), and that a man named Shirk 
and a colored man sold the waters from Dixon Gulch on 
the streets in Bingham for drinking purposes. The wit-
ness testif,ied that he bought this water and paid $2.00 
a month for a bucket each day, and at times when the 
men did not deliver it he had to go to a point below th'a't 
wooden tank and from the overflow fill his bucket him-
self; that that was where Shirk and the colored man 
got the water they peddled in the town for drinking 
and other like uses. (Tr. 541). And the witnes~s testi-
fied that the photograph (Exhibit 30) was tak,en at a 
point in the bottom of Dixon Gulch immediately below 
the wooden tank on the ridge (Tr. 529), and when that 
picture was taken the gulch was dry at that point, 
which "was the usual condition during the summer-
time" for a distance of about three hundred feet (Tr. 
535) up to the point where Mr. Bourgard and Mr. Oddie 
took the water into their pipe line. ('Tr. 539) "When 
it rained it was wet; when it didn't rain it was dry." 
Mr. Herman Harms, State Chemist for the State 
of Utah, testif'ie'd (Tr. 662-663) : 
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Ordinary water used for drinking purpos•es 
should be absolutely free from copper solutions 
and other metallic substances. On the other 
hand, ,a certain limit has been established, and 
that is, pmetically speaking, one-tenth of a grain 
of copper or lead o·r the other metallic substances 
like zinc per gallon of water, i.e., 1/70 or .0143-
of a pound per one thousand gallons of water. If 
one were to drink water containing in solution 
a larger quantity of copper, vomiting or nausea 
and vomiting would be bound to occur. The ef-
fect upon the stomach of drinking such water, if 
it could be retained, would be to irritate and in-
jure the mucous membrane and cause ulcers, spots 
and similar abnormal eonditions. 
Dr. 11,. E. Straup, a physician and surgeon who had 
resided in Bingham and practir"ed his profession there 
ever since 1896, testified much as had Dr. Inglesby to 
the sale upon the streets of Bingham of the Dixon Gulch 
waters from the wooden tank for culinary purposes 
(Tr. 581), and that that water was good drinking water. 
Dr. Stmup recalled a·lso where the water was taken out 
of Dixon Gulch for the wooden tank, which he testified 
was right in the bottom of Dixon Gulch about three hun-
dred feet up the gulch from the wooden tank. That 
witness further testified that the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
was solid rock exposed from the mouth of the gulch up 
to the intake for the pipe line leading to the wooden tank 
on the ridge (Tr. 583) and that tl)e gulch below that 
intake was dry except at times of surface run-off in 
the spring or when it was raining; that ''in the summer-
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time there was nothing there; it was all dried." Dr. 
Straup testified that there were two springs up the 
g11lch far beyond this intake to the pipe line leading 
to the wooden tank, and other than those two spnngs 
he had observed no water in Dixon Gulch in those days. 
(Tr. 585) On his cross examination, responsive to 
counsel's questions with relation to the waters that of 
recent years flowed through the railroad fill, the wit-
ness said ( rrr. 593) : 
I think the only judgment of a man knowing 
these conditions before as I saw them, would be 
that, after the fill was there, it was the water 
that had ,always come from up the gulch that 
came down there. 
And again ('Tr. 602): 
All I know about this whole story is, until 
that fill was put in there, there was no obstruc-
tion to this water coming down there, at all, 
in the gulch, and during that time this gulch 
was dry at certain seasons of the year ... Now 
when this fill was put in and this pipe line done 
away wi,th that led to these t'anks, there was wa-
ter began to come down the gulch later on. 
A. L. Heaston, whose recollection went back to 1880, 
testified (Tr. 546) that in the early days they brought 
water into Dixon Gulch for placer mining by ditches 
from Markham and Cottonwood Gulches, and from Carr 
Fork, and that when the placer miners would let the 
water go from their operations in Dixon Gulch it would 
wash. out the gulch and leave the bedrock and boulders 
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exposed all the way from the placer workings out to 
the mouth of the gulch (Tr. 556); that he had seen 
solid rock in the bottom of .the gulch exposed there for 
two or three hundred feet (Tr. 557). Mr. Heaston testi-
fied that the only water having its source in Dixon 
Gulch was in two springs, one six or eight hundred 
feet up the gulch from the Bingham & Garfield tracks, 
and the other still farther up (Tr. 546), that the spring 
run-off ceased about the first of June; that the wooden 
tank on the ridge had been built more than forty years 
ago to supply the Bingham Hotel and others with cul-
inary water (Tr. 548); that that was all the water Mr. 
Bourgard had until the city water was put in; that the 
water from Dixon Gulch was used in Mr. Bourgard's 
butcher shop for twenty-five years (Tr. 551) and that 
there was no spring in Dixon Gulch down the gulch 
from the placer workings. (Tr. 554). 
John G. Hocking testified similarly to the wooden 
tank and its waters, and the uses to which the same 
were put (Tr. 568), and that he had never observed any 
other waters in Dixon Gulch where 'the Bingham & Gar-
field Railway fill and tracks now are, or from there 
down toward Bingham Canyon; that the water in Dixon 
Gulch came from up above the placer workings. 
Charles Kelly testified that he had gone to work 
for Mr. Bourgard in his butcher .shop in March of 1903 
or 1904, and had worked for him for eighteen years; 
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that he had looked after the diversion of the waters 
of DiX<on Gulch for Mr. Bourgard. That witness testi-
fied that in those days the water for the wooden tank on 
the ridge was taken out of Dixon Gulch at a point just 
below the placer workings (Tr. 621); that after the 
railroad fill was constructed across Dixon Gulch there 
was no more water, and he went up Dixon Gulch to 
find what the trouble was and found that the railway 
company was diverting the water to its depot buildings 
through a two-inch pipe line from up the gulch. 
Mr. Frank 0. Haymond, General Superintendent of 
the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, testified 
that in July or August of 1911 he had constructed a 
pipe line from the springs up above in Di:J{lon Gulch over 
to the Bingham & Garfield Railway depot, station house 
and bunkhouse, and diverted the water1s of those springs 
from Dixon Gulch accordingly, the water being used 
for culinary purposes, that Jerome Bourgard complain-
ed about his taking the wa,ter away from the wooden 
tank on the ridge, and that the witness, together with 
H. C. Go,odrich and Mr. Bourgard, went up to the 
springs together, and Mr. Goodrich promised Mr. Bour-
gard he would keep the water in the wooden tank, 
which was done by laying a pipe line over the surface 
from the railway depot buildings down the gulch to the 
wooden tank, the railway company taking all the water 
from the springs but supplying Mr. Bourgard at the 
wooden tank through that pipe line from the depot 
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buildings. (Tr. 458 to 461). The witness further testi-
fied that he had been in Dixon Gulch ,below the rail-
road fill "hundreds and hundreds of times," that the 
railroad fill had not been constructed when he entered 
the employ of the railway company and that there was 
then lots of solid rock exposed in the bottom of the gulch 
below the railroad fill (Tr. 463), and that there was 
no water in sight below the railroad fill except at cer-
tain 1seasons of the year during the spring run-off, melt-
mg snows and heavy ram. (Tr. 464). 
L. F. Strobel, a civil engineer, as well as a rail-
road construction and mining engineer of the broadest 
expe~ience, entered the employ of the Bingham & Gar-
field Railway Company in August of 1910, as division 
engineer in Bingham, at which time the railroad fill 
had just been started across Dixon Gulch (Tr. 431). 
The witness testif,ied that at tha;t time he had made 
certain observations with particular reference to the 
occurrence of water in the gulch, and that he noted a 
little trickle of water on bedrock beneath where the 
lower portion of the fill would be made, which water 
was being collected and diverted into the wooden tank 
on the ridge; that there were no springs within that 
area; that the springs were five or six hundred feet 
above the railroad tracks westerly of the boundary of 
defendants' property and within the property of plain-
tiff; that the water from those springs was being used 
for drinking and other culinary purposes by the con-
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tractors and gangs on t'he grade (Tr. 435); that Ex-
hibit 30 was a· photograph of the lower portion of Dixon 
Gulch a:t the lower part of r.l'ract D, which ''rises up 
rather fast and that was all bedrock in there." (rrr. 438) 
Harry Bowman testified that in 1915 and 1916 he 
had sunk the incline shaft shown on the middle of the 
photograph, plaintiff ',s Exhibit X, marked ''shaft,'' to 
the right of Traet D, at which time he was employed 
by the Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Oom-
pany, which held a lease and option upon the defend-
ants' property. He testified he had been acquainted 
with Dixon Gulch for twenty-three years. (Tr. 498) 
His testimony concerning the wooden tank, the diver-
sion of water from Dixon Gulch for that tank, and the 
culinary usns to which it was applied, was much the 
same as that of the others to whose testimony we have 
referred. In the sinking of the incline shaH no water 
was encountered until he had reached a depth of two 
hundred feet, when the water rose twenty-five feet in 
the shaft and remained at that level, from which he 
concluded that was the ground wa:ter level, one hundred 
seventy-five feet from the surface. (Tr. 514) And the 
witness testified that where Bourgard and Oddie took 
their water for the wooden tank was on solid rock (Tr. 
504) up Dixon Gulch at an elevation above the wooden 
tank, but that the water came from the springs up 
above the placer workings; (Tr. 518) that otherwise 
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the gulch was dry except when the snow and rain was 
running off. (Tr. 508-9). 
William Robbins testified that he had been em-
ployed by the T'own of Bingham from 1914 to 1927 as 
ro,ad supervisor and water master, and that a cement 
dam had been placed below the toe of the railroad fill 
across Dixon Gulch, and the wa;ter passing through the 
railroad fill backed up against the cement dam and 
made a pool, where the boys used to swim in the years 
1919 to 1922, and that at that time there was vegetable 
growth in tha,t pool of the same character that he had 
observed in all other water. And as further evidence 
that the waters of Dixon Gulch did not contain copper 
in those days, he testified that the water had had no 
effect upon the galvanized iron flume that had been 
constructed to convey the flood waters from Dixon 
Gulch across the street into Bingham Canyon. (':rr. 
2497). 
When the several photographs composmg plain-
tiff's E]Chibit X were taken, the hillside appeared as 
there shown, and it was only in the course of the trial 
that the defendants uncovered two short inclines driven 
by pr.ospectors s.o long ago that they had been entirely 
covered over with surface wash. Their location is indi-
cated by two crosses in pencil in the middle of Exhibit 
X on a dashed line in blue about two inches above 
Tract C, as delinea,ted upon that exhibit. They found 
26 
the incline nearest the dump, the south incline, filled 
with water that contained no copper, while the north 
incline was full of copper water. r:l'his oceurrence was 
explained by plaintiff's engineers and geologists as a 
diversion of non-copper waters into the south incline 
by a porphyry dyke to which we will later refer, and 
as a leaking of copper waters into the north incline 
from the drain tunnel immediately above. The water 
did not flow from either of these inclines, although 
there was a seep from the fre:sh water or south incline 
so slight as not to be discernible to an observer unless 
he were standing at that spot, where he could have 
seen a slight moisture, so slight that it evaporated in a 
very short distance, never reached the bottom of the 
gulch and never flowed or trickled down the hillside 
toward the bottom of the gulch. 
Ray H. Kenner, the then Justice of the Peace at 
Bingham, was called by the defendants to te,stify to 
the water occurrences in Dixon Gulch before the rail-
road fill was constructed, and he testified that in 1896 
he was prospecting and put in three or four hours 
working in Dixon Gulch in the vicinity of the south in-
cline to which we have just referred. He testified that 
then the south incline was full of straw-colored water, 
but that that was the only place he had observed on 
that ledge (hereafter called the" sulphide vein") where 
there was actually water accumulated. (Tr. 1235) That 
sulphide vein or ledge is the place in the bottom of 
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Dixon Gulch where the Hays Spring, according to de-
fendants' contention, is supposed to bubble up from 
depth, but Mr. Kenner in his prospecting confined him-
self to f,orty or fifty feet either way from the south 
incline (Tr. 1231), evidently because the south incline 
wa,s the only place where he could get water to wash 
his gravel----'he carried his gravel to the south incline, 
not to the bottom of Dixon Gulch. (Tr. 1230) The 
witness te'stified there was no water coming out in 
Dixon Gulch under where the railr,oad fill now is. (Tr. 
1222) This witness also testified that water flowed 
down Dixon Gulch from under the toe of the railroad 
fill in 1913, ·and that the water then wa:s clear, and 
did not have the color of the water in the gulch today. 
The witness selected Exhibit 44 as indicating the char-
acter of the water flowing in the hottom of Dixon 
Gulch in 1896, the water at that time being clear, potable· 
wwter. The witness selected Exhibit 41 as indicating 
the straw-colored water of the south incline, which he 
testified "had a slight iron tint to it." (Tr. 1229) 
In addition to Mr. Kenner, the defendants called 
four witnesses upon this phase of the tes,timony, Ammon 
B. Stringham, Thomas Stringham, Richard D. Connary 
and the defendant Stephen J. Hays. The Stringham:s 
testified to the water in the north and south inclineR, 
and while they were as liberal as possible in estima,ting 
·the quantity of water in those inclines in the old days, 
still their testimony was not far out of line with that 
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of Mr. Kenner or with our present knowledge on the 
subje0t, i. e., that the only water in Dixon Gulch on or 
out of this sulphide vein from which the defendants 
contend the Hays Spring has its source was from the 
north and south inclines, which water is not now and 
never was tributary to the waters in the bottom of 
Dixon Gulch as they emerge from ~the toe of the rail-
road fill called the Hay1s Spring, or however otherwise 
identified. Mr. Kenner and the two Stringhams testi-
fied that the water from the short incline tunnels was 
not good drinking water, a fact of which we are present-
ly aware, but that the drinking water was that which 
went into the wooden tank. The defendant Hays and 
his witnes'S Connary were in a class by themselves. 
Their te1s'timony was so obviously prejudiced and con-
trary to the fact, so opposed to all other testimony in 
the case, as to be worthy of very little consideration. 
~"'or instance, the witness Connary testified with re-
lation to the waters of the so-called Hays Spring in 
the early days as follows: 
* * * I observed the character of the wa-
ter. It seemed to have qui'te a lot of acid in it 
all the time there, that is, when I first was 
there, in about 1890. That was when it was com-
ing out of the rock ledge. After the B & G 
fill was put in, there appeared to be consider-
able acid in it about like i't was before. The 
water looked pretty much the same as it does 
now. We couldn't Ulse i~t; some of the boys 
tried to fill their carbide lamps there and they 
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would have tins to dip this water and in a short 
·time the tins would be full of holes. (Tr. 973). 
The defendant Hays testified to substantially the 
same effect. That testimony is opposed to that of some 
thirteen other witnesse·s, three of whom were for the 
defendants. Moreover, that water was being diverted 
int·o the wooden tank, from which irt was used for cul-
inary purposes for many years. Plaintiff's witne,ss 
G. C. Earl described the Bourgard and Oddie intake 
(Tr. 2286 to 2291) and tes,tified to a survey made under 
his supervision in September of 1912, whereby was 
definitely located the then intake for the Bourgard and 
Oddie pipe line to their wooden tank on the ridge, the 
original notes of which were introduced in evidence. 
(Tr. 2125 to 2132, Exhibit 83) Mr. Earl platted upon 
E~hibit VI the toe of the railroad fill and the Bour-
gard and Oddie intake as they existed in September 
of 19J 2, together with the pipe line and wooden tank, 
and testified that in September of 1912 there wws no 
water flowing in the bottom of Dixon Gulch below that 
intake; that bedrock was exposed below the intake in 
the bottom of the gulch at the time of that survey, 
and that the water to which the defendant Stephen 
Hays and his witness Gonnary had testified was copper 
water then and prior thereto the source of the waters 
of the Hays Spring, would have flowed (if there had 
been any such) into the Bourgard and Oddie intake 
and thence into the wooden tank and would have been 
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devo'ted to the culinary uses already described. 
Mr. Earl testified that in October of 1912 plaintiff 
had made a complete diversion of the Dixon Gulch 
waters at the springs above the railroad tracks and 
above the placer workings, and that thereupon the 
flow at the Bourgard and Oddie intake dried up. (Tr. 
93 and 2344) In July of 1915 (Tr. 202 and 2145) the 
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company and plaintiff 
secured other water f,or their use~s above the railroad 
fill and no longer diverted the Dixon Gulch waters at 
the springs above the placer workings, whereupon the 
water again flowed through the railroad fill at the toe 
in the bottom of Dixon Gulch wherever that toe may 
have been, the location of the toe of the railroad fill 
varying with the widening and sloughing off of the 
fill. This witness testified, however, that on March 
12, 1915, there was no water flowing at the site of the 
so-called Hays Spring (Tr. 2300), fortifying his recol-
lection by the drawing on Exhibit 85 made at the time. 
Mr. Earl's elucidating testimony continued as follows: 
I designed the cribbing appearing in the 
lower portion of Exhibit No. 24. The actual work 
in connection with this cribbing was done in 
picking out this particular location for this crib-
bing and deciding upon its construction * * dur-
ing the spring and .summer of 1915. * * * I 
made surveys with relation to that crib design. 
The survey was made on March 12, 1915. I was 
there during the entire time it was made. The 
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cribbing was constructed just * * up the hill from 
the concrete dam which is shown upon exhibit 
6 and marked 'concrete dam.' * * * ( Tr. 2135) 
* * 'L1he rock wall was there at the time. This 
cribbing was along the line of the gulch 225 feet 
below the sulphide ledge as it is projected across 
the bottom of the gulch. The cribbing was con-
structed on bedrock. * * * 
And after identifying Exhibits 84 and 85, the ong-
inal field notes and plat of that survey, and explaining 
the purpose the cribbing was intended to serve, con-
tinued: 
* * * Bedrock is shown on the plan, also 
on the section 'solid rock channel' has been wri't-
ten with arrows indicating its extent as disclosed 
by that survey. That was bedrock. It is also 
shown on the section and written-with the words 
written along the bottom of the gulch and reading, 
''Bottom of gulch, solid rock.'' At the time thi,s 
survey was made we had just completed the con-
s,truction of the track 4 the previous year, that 
would he in 1914, and had enlarged Bingham 
& Garfield Railway yards on the outside of the 
down canyon, the east slope. (Tr. 2141) * * * 
this plan also shows the toe of the railroad fill 
on the date of that survey March 12, 1915. At 
the date of my survey the railroad fill had not 
reached the rock wall except that one corner, 
the southerly corner. * * * At the time this 
survey was made I examined closely the bottom 
of that gulch in order to determine the proper 
kind of construction to put in, in order to pro-
hibit any fill material from going down into the 
flume or canyon, and at that time there was llO 
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water whatever appearing upon the channel of 
(Tr. 2142) that gulch. The water from the 
streams up above the railroad tracks was still 
going into the Bourgard and Oddie tank which 
was on the ridge. * * * This water was be-
ing diverted up in the concrete reservoir * * • 
above the Bingham & Garfield railroad yards 
through a pipe line, some of it being used in the 
.buildings of the Bingham & Garfield Railway 
above and enough was permitted to run down 
to keep the Bourgard and Oddie tank supplied 
which was on the ridge jus•t above this point 
shown on this exhibit 85. The pipe line was 
constructed in 1912, some two and a half years 
•before. When I made this survey in 1915 this 
water was conveyed t·o the Bourgard tank through 
that pipe line. (Tr. 2143) All of the water ex-
cept in flood seasons in Dixon Gulch above the 
railroad tracks was colleeted in the concrete 
reservoir and was carried through the pipe line, 
none of it being permitted to come .down the 
bottom of the gulch, this pipe line furnishing 
the water to the Bingham & Garfield railway 
buildings and also to the Bourgard and Oddie 
tank. * * * The complete diversion was be-
gun in the summer of 1912, I can't state exactly 
what time, I know it was before the 18th of Sep-
tember and it was completed within four or five 
days after the 14th of October, 1912. ( Tr. 
2144) The B & G ceased to make this diversion 
fr.om the waters up above the railroad track in 
July, 1915. 
* * * There is also a ground line shown 
and a date December 9, 1919. In the four years 
any matter that had been washed in that came 
in some way there on top of bedrock and that 
represents the difference between bedrock and 
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so-called ground level. When I made those ob-
serva:tions there was no Hays Spring. There 
was a little bit of water encountered in the con-
struction of the concrete dam in 1919, and there 
was also a little bit of water in the old (Tr. 2146) 
Bourgard and Oddie diversion pipe line up above 
in the gulch. The pipe line which Bourgard and 
Oddie had used to divert the wa'ter in 1912 was 
* * * still intact,-the part going underneath 
the Bingham & Garfield railway fill, the place 
where it entered into the fill was still intact 
for a short distance out on the side hill. In 
1919 there was a little bit of water coming out 
through this pipe line. I remember particularly 
because we tried to use that water for mixing 
the concrete in the construction of the concrete 
dam and there was not sufficient there to mix 
the concrete. At one time in the construction 
of * * this concrete dam we com1eded onto 
that old Bourgard and Oddie pipe line and piped 
the water down to the dam site hut later 
we had to extend the pipe line up to the Bingham 
& Garfield railway yards in order to get suffi-
cient water to mix the concreie. That was in 
1919; the pipe line leading from tlte concrete 
reservoir in Dixon Gulch above the Bingham & 
Garfield railway fill had been disconnected and 
the water permitted to run down the bottom 
of the gulch. (Tr. 2147) The area I haYe shown 
on exhibi't 85 as a solid rock channel is about 
80 to 100 feet below the falls, probably not quite 
that far, 60 feet \Vould probably be more nearly 
correct from the bottom of the falls and 80 to 
100 feet from the top. (Tr. :2148) 'l'he falls 
were below the sulhpide vein, if projected across 
the bo'Uom of the gulch,-about :W feet in eleva-
tion below the sulphide ledge or sulphide vein. 
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I cannot show on Exhibit 6 the toe of the 
railroad fill in ] 916. The last location of the 
toe ·of the fill that we have by survey is that 
small part of it shown upon this last exhibit, 
which was in HJ15; I am referring to exhibit 8fl. 
In 19] 5 the Hays Spring was not then at its 
present location. Of course, the ground line as 
shown in pencil on exhibit 85 as result of the 
survey in connection with the concrete dam in 
December, 1919, shows that Hays Spring could 
not have been at its present location. In 1915 
the Hays Spring was non-existent. '~ * * 
H. C. Goodrich, the plaintiff's chief engineer testi-
fied in part as follows: 
* * * During the construetion of the Bing-
ham & Garfield Railway there was a man by the 
name of Bourgard who claimed the waters in 
Dixon Gulch. 'Phe Bingham & Garfield Railway 
Company, under my supervision, had built a pipe 
line from a spring in Dixon Gulch, taking all of 
the waters from a point above the railroad em-
bankment at certain seasons of the year into 
this pipe line and into their various buildings 
to be used for domestic and culinary purposes. 
As soon as that diversion was made, Mr. Bour-
gard came to me and complained about the Bing-
ham & Garfield Railway Oompany taking his 
water. (rl'r. 325) 'l'his controversy ended in 
an agreement between Bourgarcl and the Bing-
ham & Garfield Railroad Company whereby the 
Railroad Company paid Bourgard $500.00 for any 
surplus waters in Dixon Gulch and the Railroad 
Company provided a certain amount of water to 
flow down Dixon Gulch to Bourgard 's pipe line 
and tank. Now after the pipe line was built by 
the Railroad Company the gulch below dried up 
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and there was no water coming out below the rail-
road fill. * * * The waters that come from 
the Utah Copper dump during the flood seas.on 
when there is lots ·of water will come from the 
Utah Copper property into Dixon Gulch under-
neath the railroad fill bC':tween bedrock and the 
bottom of thn fill and in the fill itself and at 
times will flow out of the fill through the soil 
outside of the fill. (Tr. 328) 
I would say that Dixon Gulch is a well de-
fined channel. * * * The entin) gulch is a 
well defined channel. I would say the waters 
'that come through the fill and find their way 
into tract D come through in a well defined chan-
nel. The channel is all of Tract D; they come 
through everywhere in all of that area. During 
the low season of the year I belie,·e the par-
ticular part of Tract D where they came through 
is the bottom of gulch, * * * they would 
also flow through the drain tunnel. Except in 
the drain tunnel and the bottom of the gulch 
they would not come through any other place 
at low water season in commercial quantities. 
(Tr. 329) * * * I say that in a low water a 
flow like it is now that substantially all of the 
water will come through the drain tunnel or come 
down underneath and flow into the old channel 
of Dixon Gulch; it will come down the bottom 
of the gulch. ( 'l'r. 330) ~· * 'l'he spring 
that comes out below the rock wall that we have 
been talking about in the bottom of the gulch 
comes out on top of material in the bottom of 
the gulch, ooming out of the railroad fill. It does 
not come out of the side of the hill. * * * 
The water that I saw coming out of ihe bottom 
of Dixon Gulch is above the concrete wall and 
below the rock wall, * * * it was coming out 
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of the material in the bottom of the gulch from 
the railroad fill. There is at least 20 feet of 
railroad fill in there. * * * My idea would 
be that water is coming down through the rail-
road fill and finds an outlet on top of the ma-
terial in the bottom of the gulch below the rail-
road fill. * * * All of the waters that make 
in the Utah Copper dump will cross Tract D 
and come out at the bottom. As to my knowing 
of any other well defined channel through which 
waters have come, or would be expected to come, 
than the bottom of the gulch in Dixon Gulch on 
Tract D, there is none; there is not any well de-
fined channel that (Tr. 334) any man could pos-
sibly figure that water could come out of, m my 
judgment, in Dixon Gulch, on Tract D. (Tr. 
335) * "" "" 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 30, which you show 
me, looks like a photograph of a part of the bot-
tom of Dixon Gulch. If it is a part of the Dixon 
Gulch at all, it is my judgment that it would 
be about where the concrete dam is shown 
in Exhibit 6. rrhat is at the bottom boundary 
of Tract DY. The concrete dam is the point from 
which the ·waters are diverted from Tract DY and 
taken * * down the raise into the tunnel. I 
observed the bottom of Dixon Gulch before the 
railroad fill was constructed across that gulch. 
(':er. 4J 6) The photograph Exhibit 30 looks very 
much like any place in the bottom of Dixon 
Gulch within probably 40 or 50 feet around where 
the concrete dam is located, it looks to me as if 
the photograph were taken below the berrd in 
the bottom of the channel; it is located about 40 
feet above the concrete dam. Before the rail-
road fill was made there bedrock was exposed 
at that point, as shown in this photograph. From 
that point on up the gulch bedrock was exposed 
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for 150 to 200 feet. I made observation as to 
the occurrence of water in the bottom of Dixon 
Gulch and on the sides to the right and left where 
the railroad fill was subsequently made. I ob-
served there wasn't any water on that part of 
Tract D that the railroad embankment was placed 
on other than the water running down the chan-
nel, except during the rainstorms and periods of 
melting snows. (rl'r. 417) rrhe water running 
down the channel is the water to which I have 
already te,stified to as having been diverted by 
Bourgard and Oddie and the Bingham hotel peo-
ple into this tank and for use in the hotel. 
It is not our purpose here to abstract nearly 4000 
pages of testimony, but we have tried to refer suffi-
ciently to the testimony to establish this fact,-that there 
is not now and never was a Hays Spring, that no part 
of the water's plaintiff is taking into its pipe line from 
Tract 0 in Dixon Gulch have their sources in any spill-
ing over the lip of a synclinal basin (the sulphide ledge 
or vein) or in any other manner arising upon the de-
fendants' premises, but that on the contrary the whole 
of the waters plaintiff so receives upon rt'ract 0 are 
the waters flowing from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon 
Gulch, thence through the railroad fill and down Dixon 
Gulch on and above bedrock and across the premises of 
defendants to and into plaintiff's intake on Tract C. 
(2) 
Point 
The Geologic Case 
Upon that record all the geologists m the world 
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would be powerless to conjure up a sprmg on Tract .D. 
It was never our opinion that geologic theory could in 
any manner assist in the proof of known facts capable 
of physical observation that had been so definitely ob-
served. When a flow of water down a gulch on bGd-
rock has been observed to cease, when that flow was 
diverted at its source, recourse to geologic theory by 
which to determine the source or continuity of that 
flow or the course pursued by it when not interfered 
with would be ridiculous. And when by actual obser-
vation the fact has been definitely determined that there 
is not now nor ever was a spring upon Tract D, no 
amount of geologic theorizing can persuade one to con-
clude that there is such spring. The defendants, how-
ever, attempted that, at a great consumption of time and 
money, necessitating plaintiff's response by its geolog-
ists also, and defendant's' geologic case proved as in-
effectual as that of its lay witnesses upon the observed 
fact. 
Defendants' experts conceded frankly enough that 
unless the Bingham & Garfield Railroad fill as inter-
posed across Dixon Gulch became and was an imper-
vious barrier to the descending solutions from plaintiff's 
dumps, that then the copper solutions from those dumps 
would not have seeped through the rocks in place into 
the synclinal basin beneath, but instead would have 
flowed down Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock as the 
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culinary waters out .of the springs above had done 
in the old days to the Bourgard and Oddie intake. 
( Tr. 1329, and 1666 to 1670) There would therefore in 
their opinion have been no Hays Spring, except in the 
sense that waters flowing down the gulch on bedrock 
pas,sed thr.ough or beneath the porous material there 
and again appear farther down where bedrock was 
exposed. Such was not defendants' conception of the 
Hays Spring as pleaded nor as manifest by their ef-
fort in the cour·se of the trial. Now counsel refuse to 
define what they mean by the "Hays Spring," con-
tenting themselves with the assertion that it makes no 
difference what it is, but at the same time contending 
for all definitions, thereby enjoying a rare liberality of 
thought and expression accordingly as events may seem 
propi·tious. 
The only purpose of defendants' geologic case was 
to define the Hay.s Spring as the outlet over the lip 
of the synclinal basin, or out of the sulphide vein, 
of copper solutions having a broad subterranean source, 
a spring in the true sense whereof the defendants were 
the owners because coming to the surface on defendants' 
property. In doing this defendants' engineers and 
geologists conceded that it was necessary that there 
be created and maintained to the copper solutions de-
cending Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock, an imper-
vious barrier in the form of the railroad fill that 
would effectually block their natural course down this 
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precipitous gulch on and above bedrock and that would 
compel them to seep and percolate into bedrock beneath, 
down into the synclinal hm;in formed by the mas.sive 
quartzite ledge that constitutes the foot-wall of the 
sulphide vein, where defendants' engineers and geologists 
speculated that those solutions had accumlated, and, 
commingling with other copper solutions from a large 
pad of the Bingham District, were spilling over the 
synclinal basin in the bottom of Dixon Gulch beneath 
the railroad fill within the boundaries of the defend-
ants' property where concealed from view, thus creat-
mg the Hays Spring within defendants' domain. 
During the progress of the defendants' geologic 
case plaintiff concluded the porosity of the railroad 
fill in Dixon Gulch was capable of a physical demon-
stration, and experiments were made accordingly by 
James A. Marsh, the mine geologist of the plaintiff 
company. Before Mr. Marsh had concluded his experi-, 
ments the defendants made him their witness and pro-
ceeded to interrogate him about what he was doing (Tr. 
1422) and to put in evidence as a part of their case the 
information obtained from his experiments so far as 
then completed. In the course of defendants' examin-
ation defendants' Exhibit 64 was introduced. Subse-
quently when called by plaintiff (Tr. 2501 et seq.) 
plaintiff's Exhibits 98, 99 and 101 were introduced in 
evidence and a more complete account given of Mr. 
Marsh's observations. There were three experiments 
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planned and completed; the fourth was not planned. 
They consisted in directing a flow of water upon plain-
tiff's dump and the railroad fill and recording the re-
sults at the so-called Hays Spring and the east or lower 
portal of the Bingham & Garfield Railway Oompany's 
drain tunnel. 
ExPERIMENT No. 1 : 
November 5, 1928, at 1:25 P. M., water turned on 
Bingham & Garfield railroad fill at point marked 1 and 
colored blue on Exhibit 100 and marked "water" on 
Exhibit VII (Tr. 3040) at which time there was a 
normal now at the Hays Spring of 3474 gallons per 
twenty-four hours. Water was turned off at 9:53 P. M. 
on the same day. T·he first increase noted in the flow 
at the Hays Spring was at 8:05 P. M. with a recorded 
fl.ow of 4633 gallons per twenty-four hours, the maxi-
mum at that point being attained at 11:15 P. M. the 
same day, with a recorded flow of 17,373 gallons per 
twenty-four hours. There was no change in the flow 
of the water through the railroad drain tunnel. (Tr. 
1454 et seq.) It was estimated that approximately 43,000 
gallons of water had been turned on the railroad fill 
in the course of this experiment. (Tr. 2504). 
ExPERIMENT No. 2 : 
November 6, 1928, at 1 :25 P. M. Water was turned 
on D. Dump approximately at the toe of the G dump 
where marked on Exhibit VII "more water'' and Ex-
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hibit 100 "water," and the numeral "2'' (Tr. 1428). 
The water was turned off at 9:00 P. M. The flow at 
both the Hays Spring aml the drain tunnel showed 
rapid increase. The flow at the Hays Spring at 1 :2i) 
P. M. was 6000 gallons per twenty-four hours. The 
maximum flow was reached at 5:05 P. M. on the same 
day of 108,000 gallons per twenty-four hours, the first 
increase having been recorded at 2::-30 P. M. with a flow 
of 61,920 gallons per twenty-four hours. 
The flow at the Bingham & Garfield railroad drain 
tunnel at 1:25 P. M. was 6949 gallons per twenty-four 
hours. rrhe first increase was recorded at 3:05 P. M., 
when the flow reached 7721 gallons per twenty-four 
hours. The maximum flow attained from the drain tun-
nel was on November 7th, at 12:15 A. M., amounting to 
23,164 gallons per twenty-four hours. 
It was estimated that approximately 76,500 gal-
lons of water had been turned on D Dump in the course 
of this experiment. 
ExPERIMENT No. 3 : 
The water was turned on D dump at the point 
marked 3 on Exhibit 100, two inches to the left of the 
letter "D" in "D dump," and on Exhibit 52 at the 
point with rings around it marked "No. 3" with the 
initials '' J A'' one--half an inch to the left of the words 
"dump level," or about forty or fifty feet northerly 
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from the southerly edge of the plaintiff's dump at that 
point. (Tr. 2508). 
rrhe water was turned on November 21, 1928, at 
12 :00 o'clock noon in about an aver~age flow of 20,000 
gallons per twenty~four hours. At that time the flow 
at the Hays Spr,ing was 5610 gallons per twenty-four 
hours. The increase in flow at the Hays Spring began 
at 10:04 P. 'M. with a flow of 5915 gallons per twenty-
four hours, constantly increasing until the maximum 
of 12,705 gallons per twenty-four hour's was reached 
at 11 :00 A. M. of November 22nd. The water was turn-
ed off November 22nd at 7:05 A. M. (Tr. 2525) The 
Bingham & Garfield railroad drain tunnel showed no 
increase in flow during this experiment. (Tr. 2534) 
ExPERIMENT No. 4: 
The point at whieh water had been turned on the 
D dump is shown on the photograph Exhibit X in the 
upper left hand portion of that photograph by a blue 
line at the bottom of the supply tank. Some time dur-
ing November 17, 1928, someone, whose identity has 
never been disclosed, without the knowledge or consent 
of any of plaintiff's officials, disconncted the pipe line 
leading from the supply tank, thereby turning upon 
the dump at that point a flow of approximately 250,000 
gallons per twenty-four hours. None of that water came 
through the Bingham & Garfield railway drain tunnel. 
(Tr. 2541) A maximum flow at the Hays Spring of 
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46,328 gallons per twenty-four hour's was recorded No-
vember 18th, at 1:35 P. M. when the break was dis-
covered and the flow was shut off and the pipe re-
paired. The Hays Spring flow on November 16th 
had been 2894 gallons per twenty-four hours. (Tr. 
2539) 
These experiments speak for themselves and are 
conclusive against defendants' supposition that the 
westerly slope of the railroad fill is sealed and that 
the solutions from plaintiff's dumps are accordingly 
forced through the railroad drain tunnel. (Tr. 2667) The 
defendants' witnes~s Crocker, who qualified as an ex-
pert civil and mining engineer, testified that the railroad 
fill wa,s "'an effectual dam." "That it stops the flow 
of water down the gulch." (Tr. 1331) "I don't think 
there is any water running down the bottom of that 
gulch." (Tr. 1333) That the railroad fill would create 
a pond or lake "probably up within fifteen feet of 
the top of the fill, fifteen or twenty feet, up to where 
it has been what I term hydraulically sealed." (Tr. 
1358) "When I said it was as perfect a dam as a man 
could construct I meant it." (Tr. 1371) Such testi-
mony is not worthy of comment. 
Mr. A. H. Christensen was in charge of the con-
struction of the railroad fill acros.s Dixon Gulch, the 
work having been done by the Utah Construction Com-
pany under contract with the Bingham & Garfield Rail-
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way Company. Mr. Christensen was a director and 
vice-president of the Utah Construction Company. He 
declined to describe that fill as a "perfect hydraulic 
dam," but on the contrary described its construction 
as a ''French drain,'' wherein the largest boulders rolled 
to the bottom of the gulch preserving great apertures 
between them to permit the passage of water under 
and through the fill on down the gulch, and further 
calling attention to the fact that the fill had been con-
structed upon coarse placer gravels and boulders, all 
of which material was exceedingly porous permitting a 
relatively free passage of water down the gulch. On 
direct examination Mr. Christensen testified in part as 
follows: 
I wouldn't define the fill that we built across 
Dixon Gulch * * * as a perfect hydraulic 
dam. In the construction of this dam the bot-
tom of the gulch was filled with the coarsest 
rock we had. ('fr. 2064) * * * 'l'he material 
that went in there was ten per cent of it below 
the quarter of a cubic foot and about forty per 
cent was a quarter of a cubic foot to 18 cubic 
feet, and fifty per cent from 18 cubic feet up. 
The bottom of the gulch was boulders that came 
from these placer diggings above, and the fill 
was made on top of those boulders. ( Tr. 2065) 
As to the character of* * * the natural soil up-
gulch from this fill, it was an old placer dump and 
boulders * * * Farther up the gulch, there was 
a great deal of oak brush and gras,s; * * * 
There was no evidence of erosion on the hillside. 
* * * I observed the west slope and west 
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toe of the fill shortly before the Utah Copper 
Company began dumping there. * * * Three 
years ago the wash material from Dixon Gulch 
against the west slope and toe of this railroad 
fill didn't show any evidence of pooling. (Tr. 
2067) * * * 
and on cros.s examination in part as follows: 
* ,. * The drain tunnel was put in, we 
thought as a safety valve. I didn't think it was 
needed. (Tr. 2091) We thought we had made a 
French drain there that would take care of the 
water without the drain tunnel. I remember 
that very distinctly. I suppose the drain tunnel 
wa·s a factor of safety. * * * The French 
drain or the fill was in the bottom of the gulch. 
The coarsest rock was put in the bottom. 50 per 
cent of the excavation was rock and that natural-
ly made the French drain and we tried to make 
it as open as we could; we tried to as a safety. 
More than 50 per cent of the entire west portion 
of the B & G fill was rock, because there was 
40 per cent of it loose rock that was open stuff, 
too. The entire lower portion there is rock. 
(Tr. 2093) * * * 
Assuming that as a matter of fact in 1913 
a flood came in there which filled up the lower 
drain tunnel and filled up the bottom of the 
gulch and the lower drain tunnel to the extent 
that the water backed farther, raised back farther 
to within about 15 feet (Tr. 2099) of the top 
of the B & G fill, as to whether or not a flood 
of that character would be sufficient to seal 
that fill, I would say that it didn't, from my 
personal knowledge of it. I was doing work 
there and was up there very frequently and the 
47 
waters that came down there from the gulch at 
that time while they raised up they very soon 
disappeared. In addition to that the bottom 
of that fill or that gulch at the time we com-
menced there had so much round boulders and 
other rocks there that it would have to seal that 
gulch up 150 feet above the fill in order to keep 
it from running through under the fill. If the 
residual matter were backed up 200 feet (Tr. 
2100) I don't think it would seal it; I think 
it was a sort of an underground channel all the 
way down the gulch, where these springs above 
the fill would go down in two or three places 
they would come out * * * below. I don't 
think you could hold water np to the bottom of 
the fill; * '~ * all the fines or the silt in 
that water would be carried through it, it did 
not stop, * * * would carry it through on 
the grade like that and it would carry it through 
the fill and it would carry it on through. (Tr. 
2102) I think it would do that forever. I would 
think that in order to keep away from going 
under that fill they would have had to dug a cut 
or a channel there and put a concrete. or some 
kind of puddling or other substantial matter to 
keep the water from going under it. * * * 
The porosity of the railroad fill, including its 
westerly slope, was subjected to a most convincing test 
only a few months preceecling January 1, 1926, when 
plaintiff began dumping in Dixon Gulch. The plaintiff's 
mme geologist, Marsh, related this experience: 
I was in the court room yesterday morning 
when Mr. Hyde was testifying to his illustration, 
plaintiff's JI_Jxhibit 107. I lived in the vicinity 
of this portion of Dixon Gulch from July, 1924, 
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until about October, 1925. On the right-hand 
·corner of Exhibit 107, marked the Bevins house, 
that is the house which I occupied during my 
stay in Dixon Gulch during that period. I lived 
there in the winter time. I recall the hole as 
shown in the middle of Exhibit 107, (Tr. 2992) 
and the portion of the gulch indicated on this 
exhibit as "Toe of building fill and bottom of 
gulch.'' That illustration correctly illustrates 
that portion of Dixon Gulch as I remembered it 
in that period from .T uly of 1924 until the late 
fall of 1925. July 3, 1925, we had a considerable 
rainfall, the result of which caused a flood; at 
that time I noticed some water in that hole in 
the middle of exhibit 107. Due to this heavy 
rainfall I became rather alarmed at the condi-
tions at the house in Dixon Gulch, so I left the 
office (Tr. 2993) of the Utah Copper Company at 
Bingham-that is east of the B & G yards; it 
would be over in this direction, in the upper left-
hand corner of Exhibit 107; and when I left the 
office, of course I had to pass over the tracks; 
I generally took a path down around this way-
just below the B & G warehouse, and I came 
down and noticed up on the edge of the railroad 
fill,-I noticed the water that had collected in 
this hole. At that time I followed a path that 
would take me north of the B & G warehouse 
and in a northerly direction for some distance 
until intersecting the natural ground, which would 
be on the lower part of Exhibit 107, about near 
the point 3; and then in possibly a southwesterly 
direction, I followed along there, passed by the 
assay office, which is shown on the right-hand 
corner of Exhibit 107, and then in a southwesterly 
direction to the house which I occupied at that 
time. I observed that the water had risen there 
to about 15 or 20 feet from the edge of the B & G 
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tracks, and after going to the house, I possibly 
stayed there 40 or 45 minutes, came back the 
same way; coming back I noticed the water had 
entirely dis·appeared. (Tr. 29~J4) 'rhat was a 
cloud-burst. It had entirely disapp0ared in be-
tween 30 and 45 minutes. I lived there during 
the spring run-off of 1925. At that time I did 
not observe any water accumulated to the west 
of the west slope of the railroad fill. 'rherc 
was just the one time which I have mention0d 
now having seen any water accumulated there. 
Y·ou ask what happened to this perfect hydraulic 
dam; it didn't appear very hydraulic to me; 
seemed rather porous and permitted water any 
time it entered there to pass through it. * * * 
Defendants' geologic case can attain no greater 
strength than the supposition upon which the defendants 
have founded it, the supposition that the railroad fill 
across Dixon Gulch was effectually sealed by the de-
posit of silt along its westerly slope up to the level 
of the drain tunnel portal, and thereby became an im-
permeable barrier or dam to the descending copper 
solutions from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch. The 
obvious failure of this hypothesis, coupled with counsel's 
emphatic refusal to discuss their geologic case in either 
brief or argument, forbids our devoting as much space 
to its consideration as we might otherwise have been 
impelled to do. We will therefore very briefly describe 
their effort, and as briefly endeavor to show that the 
effort failed, not only because of the failure of the 
hypothesis upon which it was predicated, but because 
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the defendants' geologic case was wholly ineffectual 
within itself. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the cop-
per solutions could no longer flow down Dixon Gulch 
to the so-called Hays Spring, defendants' effort was 
then to supply some subterranean course whereby those 
solutions, commingled with others, their identity lost, 
could be brought from depth to the surface in the bot-
tom of Dixon Gulch as a true spring. To supply that 
course the defendants' geologists spent weeks in trying 
to prove a synclinal basin the bottom of which was 
intact and impervious, the lowest point in the lip of 
which being the very bottom of Dixon Gulch at the 
so-called Hays Spring, the presence of highly shattered 
sieve-like quartzite beds beneath the plaintiff's dumps in 
Cottonwood and Markham Gulches, in addition to those 
in Dixon, affording an efficient collecting medium for 
the copper solutions from all those dumps and the spill-
ing of those copper solutions collected from these and 
perhaps other sources and emptied into Dixon Gulch 
at the Hays Spring. Of course an expert can easily 
enough create an imaginary condition suitable to his 
purpose and may testify to it as a fact, but it is 
far more difficult to supply the premises from which 
his conclusions may be deduced. So in the case at bar 
the dips and strikes of the massive quartzite beds 
forming this synclinal basin were such as to forbid the 
conclusion that the synclinal basin underlay Cottonwood 
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Gulch or could in any possible way collect the waters 
of Cottonwood Gulch. (Tr. 2618) Instead, the massive 
quartzite ~beds of necessity form an impenetrable bar-
rier to the copper solutions of Cottonwood Gulch, for 
they were actually so tipped up as to form the ridge 
between Cottonwood and Dixon Gulches. (Tr. 2166, 2815, 
2850, 2675, 3018.) Also the Markham dump had just 
been started, had attained no sizable proportions and 
was not capable of yielding a solution of any substantial 
copper content. (Tr. 192, 2678). The shattered quartz-
ite of the less competent member showed no evidence of 
oxidation and hence the leaching of copper in place 
was out of the question, (Tr. 2666, 2671, 3017) and this 
lack of oxidation indicated also that the surface waters 
were not seeping in appreciable quantities through the 
rocks to depth. The defendants' geologists then re-
luctantly conceded that in all probability the copper in 
the solution at the so-called Hays Spring was that de-
rived from plaintiff's dump in Dixon Gulch, but counsel 
contended that those solutions had pursued such a de-
vious and unknown course from the dump in Dixon 
Gulch down into this synclinal basin and thence spilling 
over its lip into Dixon Gulch that title had passed to 
the defendants by the time those solutions arose as a 
spring upon Tract D. 
Plaintiff's geologists showed that the axis of this 
synclinal basin was not in Dixon Gulch at all, but to 
the south at the Shawmut workings, (Tr. :2611, 2845) 
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and the defendants' geologist, Dr. Pack, agreed, (Tr. 
17 41) 'rhen the plain tiff's geologists and engineers 
showed that this synclinal basin had been punctured 
directly along its axis by these Shawmut workings, 
(Tr. 2622, 2779) but that the water encountered carried 
no copper, (Tr. 2624) and plaintiff's geologists and en-
gineers showed that not only did the Shawmut work-
ings puncture this synclinal basin at its lowest point, 
i. e., along its axis, but that to the point where those 
workings so entered it was nearer the plaintiff's dump 
in Dixon Gulch than was the lip of the synclinal basin 
in Dixon Gulch, ('l'r. 3665, Ex. 100, Tr. 3673, 3677) and 
that therefore if the copper solutions from plaintiff's 
dump were getting into this synclinal basin and thence 
by subterranean courses to the Hays Spring, the water 
encountered in the Shawmut workings nearer the source 
of these copper solutions, i.e., plaintiff's dump in Dixon 
Gulch, should have been at least as strong a solution as 
that at the so-called Hays Spring, but the waters there 
encountered by the Shawmut workings carried no cop-
per. From Markham Gulch this basin was penetrated 
in a number of places and in no instance was copper 
water encountered. (Tr. 3003) Even in Dixon Gulch 
on this very sulphide vein on the south incline the 
water encountered carried no copper; apparently was 
just as it had been in 1896, when Mr. Kenner carried 
his placer gravel to that incline to wash it. The cop-
per water in the north incline could have come from 
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no other source than the plaintiff's drain tunnel, ( Tr. 
2944, 2946, 2948) convincingly demonstrated by the im-
mediate reduction in copper content of those waters 
upon the sealing off of the waters in the drain tunnel 
by the installation of the pipe line and the stopping 
of leaks in the pipe. (Tr. 2650-2658, 2696, 2702, Ex. 
103) Wherever this synclinal basin was punctured or 
waters were observed to pass from it, the waters en-
countered or otherwise observed carried no copper. 
So it became expedient, if possible, that the de-
fendants abandon their sulphide ledge by which they 
had pre,viously identified the impervious member form-
ing the bottom of the basin and select another so far 
up the mountain that the Shawmut workings would have 
passed beneath it and not into it. (Tr. 3321) The lack 
of accord between defendants' geologists has been no-
ticeable in this case. Between them they have corrobor-
ated almost every observation plaintiff's geologists have 
made. It is not surprising defendants' geologists should 
not agree. Mr. Crane hit upon a quartzite ledge way 
up above the Shawmut workings and above the Bing-
ham & Garfield railroad tracks, which he contended was 
the sulphide vein; certainly this time he put it high 
enough up the hill so that the Shawmut workings would 
not puncture it and encounter fresh water. Then of 
course he could not get it across Dixon Gulch to connect 
with that sulphide vein and ledge to which the de-
fendants had irretrievably committed themselves. Mr. 
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Crane indulged in a wild orgy of strikes and dips by 
which to bring this new sulphide ledge down to that of 
the inclines in Dixon Gulch, and Dr. Pack refused to 
be a party to the Crane effort. Judge McDonough, 
accompanied by geologists and engineers of both par-
ties, devoted two days to an examination on the ground 
of all conditions relevant to this controversy, and con-
cluded, as evidenced by his findings, that the location 
of that sulphide ledge was where Dr. Pack and the 
plaintiff's geologists first located it below the prophyry 
sill above the Shawmut workings, and that the Shaw-
mut workings passed through not only the sulphide ledge 
but the porphyry sill as well, into this synclinal basin. 
Mr. J. J. Beeson, one of plaintiff's geologists, de-
scribed as follows two reservoirs, one of copper solu-
tions in Dixon Gulch beneath plaintiff's dumps, of 
which the outlet is through the railroad fill and down 
Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock, and the other of 
fresh water within the massive quartzite beds com-
prising the great synclinal basin of the Bingham dis-
trict. Mr. Beeson's references are to his Exhibit 100: 
The copper waters flowing through the rail-
road fill at or near the rock wall, that being 
the point that the defendants have termed the 
Hays Spring, are not from this sulphide vein. 
rt1 hose copper waters, in my opinion, are merely 
waters that have come to the railroad fill near 
the point marked 57, have percolated down 
through the railroad fill, flowed down the bottom 
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of the gulch on bedrock or on surface soil in the 
bottom of that gulch and come out from under 
the surface wash in the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
at the point marked 60. 
My observations of the flow of waters, not 
only in Dixon Gulch, but in the Tiewaukee Gulch 
where a great deal of excavation was actually 
done right under the dump (Tr. 266-1) and I had 
a good chance to observe the flow of the copper 
waters-is that within that basin, * * * 
there is usually a thick mantle of soil * * * 
black soil and clay, and that surface has been 
completely sealed. * * * 
We have here a large reservoir which is 
formed by the sulphide vein or the contact be-
tween the competent and incompetent member, 
and that formation has been highly fractured and 
surface waters have passed into it from the up-
turned beds, as exposed to the south of the 
point where I have shown the outcrop, * * * 
-the section there is highly fractured with north-
east southwest fissures. These same fissures 
would lead down under the bottom of Dixon Gulch 
at different points; the waters have passed :iown 
through those formations and reached the work-
ings of the Shawmut tunnel and flowed out as 
fresh waters. In the vicinity of Dixon Gulch, the 
waters that have not been contaminated with ;he 
copper water from the B & G drain tunnel, arc 
fresh waters; and so that is my evidence that 
that reservoir is filled with fresh waters. 
Within that reservoir is another one which 
is the natural surface of the ground as it ap-
peared before the Utah Copper dump was placed 
there and that surface (Tr. 2662) diverts the 
flow of copper waters down into the bottom of 
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Dixon Gulch; they pass down to the railroad fill 
" * " (Tr. :266:3). T'hen the copper waters 
percolate through that railroad fill, flow on down 
the bottom of Dixou Gulch on bedrock and 
emerge out of the point marked 60, that is, part 
of the water comes out and a part finds an easy 
aocess through the B & G drain tunnel and comes 
out the portal at the point marked 58. Point 60 
is the point that has been called the Hays Spring. 
If the copper waters " " * pass down into 
the solid rock below bedrock, * * * seep into 
the fractured, broken-up quartzite, they would be 
dammed by the porphyry dike, * * * they 
would emerge-come out to the surface again at a 
lower elevation, and the logical place to find those 
waters would be in the fresh water incline which 
starts ou the sulphide vein about the middle of 
the porphyry dike, passes through the porphyry 
dike and intercepts a number of small fissures, 
and the water coming into that fresh water in-
cline is fresh water. 'rhis porphyry dike would 
act as a barrier or a dam which would not permit 
the waters to flow down through the solid rock 
and come out at any spring in the vicinity of 
the sulphide vein. 
The sulphide vein here is also impervious, 
so we have a low point in the trough at the fresh 
water incline, ( Tr. 2664) and the waters coming 
out at that point are fresh water, so if any cop-
per was going down into the solid rock, passing 
through fissures and fractures-and this country 
is highly fractured and fissured-it would come 
out in the fresh water incline. 
That would also account-the presence of 
the porphyry dike here acting as a barrier, would 
account for the fact that the sulphide vem, as 
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far as we know it, is perfectly dry where it goes 
through Dixon Gulch to the south of the fresh 
water incline. (Tr. 2665) 
The significance those fissures had to me 
with relation to this problem we have under 
cong.ideration was simply this, that, in the case 
of this Jersey Blue fissure, it passes right up 
under the Cottonwood Gulch and comes through 
the workings of the U & I tunnel, the U & I 
tunnel is flowing water at the portal and it is 
quite probable that fissure does carry some of 
that water at the portal, and that is fresh water 
there and if there was a migration of that cop-
per water through there it might possibly con-
taminate this water, which it doesn't; and these 
various fissures through here, if they served as 
a channel for waters coming from underneath 
the Cottonwood Gulch or underneath Dixon Gulch, 
either one, they would be intercepted by the 
Shawmut workings of the Shawmut tunnel and 
the waters flowing out of the mill tunnel would 
be copper waters. Instead they are fresh waters. 
There are five fissures shown intercepted by the 
Shawmut tunnel, and I have also observed a fis-
sure right at the shaft which faults the porphyry 
sill slightly. That would extend up into that 
trough also. (Tr. 2759) Immediately above the 
Shawmut incline shaft the porphyry sill is off-
set for a distance of about 6 or 8 feet on a fault 
which is about parallel to the axis of the syncline 
and that fault would penetrate-it does pene-
trate the porphyry sill and passes into the rock 
or hanging wall, and that would have a tendency 
to drain any waters within that basin over to 
that point of the hanging wall side of the por-
phyry sill, and there we observed fresh waters 
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also. So that, if those fissures were channels 
for water either from Cottonwood Guleh into this 
syncline or from Dixon Gulch into this syncline, 
and were means of conveying copper water from 
one place to the other, it would be apparent from 
the waters in the Shawmut tunnel * '~ * 
To the same effect is the testimony of plaintiff's 
geologist :F'rederick D. Hanson (Tr. 2811, 2815, 2817, 
2819, 2939), arriving at his conclusion as follows (Tr. 
2821) : 
In my opnnon there is no other source than 
the Utah Copper <lump in Dixon Gulch for the 
copper waters issuing from beneath the B & G 
fill at the point designated as Hays Spriug. It 
is my opinion that those waters from that source 
find their way to this point designated as the 
Hays Spring by flowing on top of the surface 
soil or at least ( rrr. 2t-l21) on top of bedrock 
and not below it. 
and the testimony of plaintiff's geologist, J. A. Marsh 
(Tr. 3009, 3015). 
(3) 
Point 
"These waters had a copper content in 1920 ... and had a 
commercial content in 1926 and 1927, three or four years be-
fore, according to plaintiff's own evidence, the dumps in Dixon 
Gulch should give off any solutions," Appellants' Brief, page 
26. 
The above is copied from appellants' brief at page 
26 and relates for the most part to the testimony of 
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George B. Rohbe, a witness called by the plaintiff, 
who testified October 22, 1928. Mr. Robbe was a mining 
engineer, the owner of a precipitating plant in Bingham 
Canyon and was then engaged in the business of pre-
cipitating the copper content from copper solutions 
from Mc.Guire and Dixon Gulches. Mr. Robbe began 
treating the copper solutions of Dixon Gulch June 19, 
1928, (Tr. 481) at which time the copper content in 
those waters was ''a little over twelve pounds per thous-
and gallons'' ( Tr. 483) sampled below the railroad fill, 
but the witness testified that had he not had a precipi-
tating plant already built and in operation, with suffi-
cient surplus capacity, those solutions would not then 
have been commercial. (Ex. 64) The witness had 
commenced taking samples of the Dixon Gulch waters 
in November of 1920 (Tr. 486), when his recollection 
was that that water showed a trace of copper, that 
is to say, between .0416 and .0832 of a pound of copper 
per thousand gallons of water. ('Tr. 487) All his 
samples were taken below the railroad fill. The witness 
also sampled the Dixon Gulch waters in 1921, 1922, 
1923 and 1924, during which period no increase in cop-
per content appeared. In May of 1927, the witness 
again sampled those waters and obtained a copper con-
tent of between eight and nine pounds per thousand 
gallons. (Tr. 493) 
There follows on page 26 of appellants' brief the 
following: 
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The witness Earl gave the history of all 
Utah Copper Company dumps. Practically all of 
them remain from six to twelve years before 
giving off any solutions. He gave as his opin-
ion that it takes four or five years before dumps 
give off commercial solutions, 
and counsel refers us to appellants' abstract at pages 
123-124. No abstract can be of much assistance wherein 
the attempt is made to condense nearly four thousand 
pages of testimony into five hundred pages of abstract. 
For instance, at this point the defendants thought it 
quite unnecessary to include in their abstract the wit-
ness' description of the transformation from culinary 
waten; to copper solutions with the dumping in each 
gulch. We resort directly to the transcript from pages 
182 to 196 and one will search there in vain for any-
thing in the testimony to support the statement we 
have just quoted, that "practically all of them remain 
from six to twelve years before giving off any solu-
tions." Mr. Earl did not testify as to when the dumps 
gave off solutions; he did testify as to what the experi-
ence had been as to the length of time required befor: 
those solutions became commercial, and he was careful 
to say that there were so many elements entering into 
that consideration that it could not be said as applied 
to any specific case that three or four years would be 
required to produce a commercial copper solution. Mr. 
Earl also testified on cross examination that the plain-
tiff's dump in Markham Gulch had been started in 
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January or :B~ebruary of 1928, and that in October of 
that same year the water carried copper, although not 
commercial, (Tr. 163) and Mr. Earl testified as follows 
with relation to the dump in Cottonwood Gulch, being 
the gulch next south from Dixon Gulch: 
The dump in Cottonwood Gulch was begun 
in July, 1924. Prior to that time there had heen 
potable water flowing in that gulch. It had been 
used by the town of Bingham for a portion of its 
water supply. Since that time a flow of copper 
solution has developed from that dump. It i~ 
commercial in form. It became commercial ill 
April, 1927. (Tr. 237) At that date there was 
about four and a half milliou tons of material 
deposited there. That material was of the same 
general characteristic as that deposited from the 
plaintiff's mine in these other dumps to which 
I have testified; it comes from the same section 
of the mine. 
Mr. Goodrich testified with relation to the dump in 
Cottonwood Gulch that the dump there was begun in 
1924, but that on .July 7, 1925, the water flowing from 
it carried 6.45 pounds of copper per thousand gallons 
of water. (Tr. 652) 
One would of course expect some copper in the 
water below the railroad fill before the making of the 
dump in Dixon Gulch started in January of 1926. Mr. 
Goodrich testified that: 
The railroad fill -..vas begun in the summer 
of 1910. The contractors got through their work 
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early in 1911 and I think during that spring the 
fill was completed by hauling mine waste from 
the Utah Copper mine. . . . There has been a 
track put through the yard and part of that ma-
terial was added to the fill, but not very much. 
I should say about sixty per cent of that fill 
is overburden from the Utah Copper mine. (Tr. 
419) 
Mr. Earl testified: 
* * * at right angles to the track the ad-
(lition in 1914 was about 24 or 25 feet ... 
* * * from 1910 up to the present time 
at right angles to the track all additions would 
amount to probably 30 some feet. (Tr. 2377) 
Sixty per cent of that railroad fill is of the same 
material as is in the Utah Copper dumps from whi·ch 
these copper solutions are derived, and of course would 
yield some of its copper just as the dumps are doing, 
the amount depending upon the quantity and grade 
of the overburden going into the fill. The copper 
surrendered being trivial in amount, a mere trace, as 
Mr. Robbe ascertained, i. e., between .0416 and .0832 of a 
pound per thousand gallons of water. Were there no 
other evidence it would appear sufficient to prove the 
source of the copper solutions that the water below the 
railroad fill so quickly after the making of the dumps 
above showed an increase in copper content from 
6/100th of a pound per thousand gallons to eight or 
nine pounds. That trace of copper prior to January 
1, 1926, came from no other source than the railroad 
fill, because the waters of the springs at the concrete 
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dam above the railroad fill were still being devoted 
to culinary uses. Mr. Marsh testified (Tr. 468) : 
From July, 1924, until late in the fall of 
1925, I resided in Dixon Gulch at a point, I 
should judge, about a thousand feet up the gulch 
from the present Bingham & Garfield yards. 
\Ve got our water for culinary purposes from a 
spring nearby the house in Dixon Gulch. The 
reservoir was possibly one hundred feet clown 
the gulch from the spring. 
The situation therefore with which we arc here con-
cerned is not that of a spring rising upon Tract D, 
title to the waters of which is in issue, but that of 
copper solutions having their origin in plaintiff's dumps 
of copper ores in Dixon Gulch on plaintiff's property 
flowing down this precipitous gulch on bedrock and 
in the railroad fill of the Bingham & Garfield Railway 
Company, coming practically in their entirety from and 
out of this railroad fill. From and out of those facts we 
are called upon to determine plaintiff's right and title 
in and to those copper solutions and plaintiff's right 
to condemn, for their conveyance, the channel over 
which they travel, together with the requisite easements 
for their collection and diversion. On this basis we 
will discuss this question. 
(B) 
Point 
The decision in the case of Utah Copper Company vs. 
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, 69 Utah 
423, 255 Pac. 672. 
Counsel urge upon this court that the above de-
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CISion 1s authority for their contention here. That 
opmwn cannot be made to serve defendants' purpose 
here. 
In the year 1907 Utah Copper Company acquired 
by grant the perpetual and exclusive right to dump its 
over-burden and low grade copper ores in Tiewaukee 
Gulch upon the property of the Montana-Bingham Con-
solidated Mining Company, and the grant provided that 
Utah Copper Company should have the right at -its 
option ''at any time to remove and dispose of any 
rock, ores, waste or material so dumped upon the sur-
face of said mining property." Utah Copper Company 
dumped somewhat more than six million tons of ma-
terial in that gulch pursuant to that and other similar 
agreements with other owners. It will be noted nothing 
was said in the contract concerning copper solutions 
making in the dump and seeping through it to the soil 
beneath and thence to bedrock and thence down Tie-
waukee Gulch over and across the property of the 
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company. The 
suit was one to condemn an easement for the construc-
tion of a tunnel to and beneath this dump, there to 
collect the copper solutions that had made in the dump 
and flowed down the gulch from above, seeping through 
the surface soil to bedrock and thence along bedrock 
and through the surface soil to the face of this tunnel 
and into the intake Utah Copper Company proposed to 
construct for that purpose. The tunnel so sought to be 
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condemned was not within the area under the easement, 
but the copper solutions were to be intercepted, collected 
and dhrerted within that area, being beneath the dumps. 
Those solutions were to be conveyed thence through the 
tunnel to be condemned and into a pipe line across and 
away from the defendants' property to plaintiff's pre-
cipitating plant. 
The purpose in that suit and that in the case at 
bar were the same, namely, the acquisition by the de-
fendants in each instance of plaintiff's valuable copper 
solutions. Of course in each instance the effort was 
clothed with an affected righteousness, the defendants 
in each case contending that by operation of law title 
to those copper solutions had vested in them. In neither 
case did the defendants want the water, it being the 
copper only that interested them. In each case the 
copper solution involved was an artificial product 
composed of ingredients all of whieh were the property 
of the plaintiff, a copper solution that was a definite, 
definable and identified substance from a known source, 
the property of the plaintiff, a known owner, wholly 
the product of plaintiff's industry and investment, mined 
by plaintiff, transported and deposited in that dump by 
plaintiff. 
In the Tiewaukee case the two estates were one 
imposed upon the other; in the case at bar the two 
estates were laterally contiguous. In the Tiewaukee 
66 
case the defendant owner of the fee contended that it 
was a right reserved to the owner of the fee to have 
the meteoric waters fall upon his land and that the 
plaintiff did not have the right to prevent those waters 
from falling upon and saturating its dump, leaching out 
its copper content, and that those copper solutions be-
longed to the owners of the fee even while in the dump, 
but especially after they had reached the natural sur-
face beneath. So in the Tiewaukee ca,se the defendant 
contested the plaintiff's right to condemn an easement 
for a tunnel and pipe line on the alleged ground that 
plaintiff was seeking to collect and divert copper solu-
tions title to which had passed to defendant, and that 
inasmuch as defendant was itself collecting those solu-
tions and precipitating therefrom their copper content, 
they were being already devoted to a public use and 
could not be condemned for the same public usc. In 
this a similarity will be noted to the issue in the case 
at bar. 'l'he defendant appealed from the judgment for 
plaintiff in that case and the judgment was affirmed 
by this court. The defendant wa;s not satisfied and 
petitioned for a rehearing and its petition was denied. 
Still not satisfied, the defendant instituted a suit in 
the Federal Court to enjoin the plaintiff's collection 
and diversion of the copper solutions on bedrock and 
in the surface soil beneath the dump on the theory that 
this court had held in the Tiewaukee case that plaintiff 
was the owner of and entitled to the copper solutions 
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only while in its dump, and that when those solutions 
had reached the natural surface of the ground below, 
title thereto passed to the defendant. But the Federal 
Court dismissed that complaint and entered its judg-
ment on Utah Copper Company's counterclaim in part 
a:s follows: 
First: Defendant Utah Copper Company is 
the owner of the dump or deposit hero involved 
and all the earth, rock, ores, minerals, waste, 
water and all other substances therein contained, 
including copper and other minerals in solution, 
also the water and copper or other minerals in 
solution flowing, seeping or percolating there-
from, not only from and out of said dump but 
from on top of the surface t-loil or rna to rial be-
neath said dump and on bedrock beneath sajd 
surface soil or material beneath said dump and 
from within the surface soil and material be-
tween bedrock and the bottom of said dump, and 
that the fact that said copper solutions touch, 
wet or saturate the top of said surface s':il 
beneath said dump, or seep into or pnrcolnte 
through said surface soil beneath said dump, or 
touch, wet or flow along, over or upon bedrol"k 
beneath said dump, neither has resulted nol· will 
result in the passing from the defendant Utah 
Copper Company to the plaintiff Montana-Bing-
ham Consolidated Mining Company of title to 
said waters and solutions, but on the contrary 
the defendant Utah Copper Company was and has 
continued, is now and will continue, the owner 
of said copper solutions while in the (lump, 
while on the surface of the soil beneath the 
dump, while on bedrock beneath the dump, and 
while in the soil and .material between bedrock 
68 
1 
and the bottom of the dump or the top of the 
surface soil and material beneath said dump; 
and said copper solutions have been heretofore 
at all times, are now and will continue to be the 
property of the defendant Utah Copper Company 
while on and above bedrock, until the same shall 
have flowed out and seeped and percolated in 
and through the soil of the plaintiff's mining 
claims, laterally beyond the periphery of said 
dump or deposit and off of and from the sur-
face right, interest and estate heretofore con-
veyed to defendant • • • 
• • * • 
Third: rrhat the plaintiff be, and it is here-
by, perpetually enjoined from molesting, inter-
fering with, collecting, impounding or diverting, 
or exercising, asserlting or •claiming any right, title 
or interest in, to or with relation to any copper 
or other waters or solutions in or beneath said 
dump or cleposit, or seeping, percolating or flow-
ing from said dump or deposit, at bedrock in 
the bottom of said gulch beneath said dump, on 
the top of said surface soil or material beneath 
said dump, on bedrock beneath said surface soil 
and material beneath said dump, or while in the 
surface soil and material between bedrock and 
the bottom of said dump or the top of said sur-
face soil and material beneath said dump, until 
the same shall have flowed out and seeped and 
percolated in and through the soil of the plain-
tiff's mining claims, laterally beyond the peri-
phery of said dump or deposit and off of and 
from said surface right, interest and estate of 
defendant. 
The United States District Court so interpreted the 
decision of this court in the case of Utah Copper Com-
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parry vs. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Com-
pany. 
Counsel appear to attach great importance to the 
following from the decision of this court: 
"* * * Were the plaintiff attempting to 
follow, collect and divert waters, though they 
carry copper in solution, after they have left 
the dump and percolating in and through the 
soil and ground of the defendant not conveyed 
to the plaintiff, the cited cases would be appli-
cable, but that is not what the plaintiff seeks 
to do. It may readily be conceded that waters, 
though they carry copper or other minerals in 
solution, which are suffered and permitted to 
flow and escape from the dump and seep and 
percolate through the soil and earth of the de-
fendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff 
and on or in which it has no surface or other 
rights, are lost to the plaintiff and become the 
:property of the defendant and may not be pur-
sued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff.'' 
(255 Pac 675). 
Had the plaintiff m the Tiewaukee case not ac-
quired the right to occupy the surface beneath its dump 
for the purpose for which it was in po·ssession, in other 
words, had been a trespasser upon that surface, this 
court would apparently have held, in accord with that 
part of its opinion above quoted, that the copper solu-
tions would have been lost to the plaintiff after they 
had seeped or percolated into or upon the surface be-
neath the dump. But the reason tho·se solutions were 
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not lost to the plaintiff in that case was that plaintiff 
was not a trespasser there, but instead had been granted 
the right to use the surfwce for the purpose to which 
plaintiff was then devoting it. Is not the situation the 
same whether that right be acquired by contract or 
condemnation? 
In the case at bar the two estates are laterally con-
tiguous, but the copper solutions nevertheless flow from 
one to the other, from the plaintiff's estate to the prem-
ises of the defendant, as in the Tiewaukee case. Were 
these solutions ",suffered and permitted (by plaintiff) 
to flow and escape from the dump and seep and perco-
late through the soil and earth of the defendants' claim 
* * * in which it has no surface or other rights," 
then under the decision of this court it might be reason-
ably argued that those solutious had been "lost to the 
plaintiff and become the property of the defendants and 
may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plain-
tiff." But what do these defendants think this suit 
is fod Not being able to acquire by contract the right 
to convey these solutions over and upon the premises 
of the defendants, plaintiff found it necessary to insti-
tute this suit by which to condemn that right, and, 
pursuant to the order of court entered into possession 
of that part of the defendants' premises required for 
that purpose, and exercising the right so conferred upon 
plaintiff in and upon those premises, plaintiff proceed-
71 
ed to and has at all times since under that right, con-
veyed its copper solutions from its dumps down to its 
intake. Plaintiff has not ''suffered and permitted'' its 
copper solutions to "escape" and "seep and percolate 
through the soil and earth of the defendants' claims 
* * * on or in which it has no surface or other 
rights," but instead plaintiff has done and is now doing 
the only reasonable and practical thing plaintiff could 
or can do whereby to prevent the ''escape'' of its 
copper solutions and prevent their seizure by others 
who have no right, title or interest in them. In the 
'Tiewaukee case and in that at bar the plaintiff's estate 
was the upper estate, that of the defendants the lower. 
In the Tiewaukee case the plaintiff's right to collect 
and convey the waters upon and through the surface 
was by contract,-in the case at bar by condemnation. 
As this court permitted that collection, conveyance and 
diver1sion upon the lower estate where the right had its 
origin in contract, so will this court protect this plain-
tiff in the conveyance, colle'Ction and diversion of its 
property where plaintiff is in possession by order of 
court made within its jurisdiction in the exercise of 
rights conferred by the statutes and laws of this state 
in aid of mining, in its each and every phase and aspect. 
Plaintiff conclusively proved that all the copper solu-
tions appearing at the so-called Hays Spring flow di-
rectly down the gulch from plaintiff's dumps above, 
through the railroad fill, and plaintiff has accordingly 
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conducted over and across Tract D not a drop of cop-
per solution or water that does not originate in plain-
tiff's dumps or flow therefrom, and that every ounce 
of copper contained in those solutions has been derived 
from plaintiff's ores contained in plaintiff's dumps. 
If we are correct in that such has been the proof in 
this case, then the conclusion is irresistible that every 
drop of those copper solutions that have appeared at 
the so-called Hays Spring has been conducted by plain-
tiff across Tract D, either through the railroad fill or 
along and upon bedrock, pursuant to the order of the 
court below and plaintiff's right thereby. By the 
court's order, plaintiff acquired the right to convey 
plaintiff's copper solutions across Tract D and plaintiff 
has been engaged in the conveyance of its copper solu-
tions across that tract at all times since, pursuant to 
that right acquired by that order. Moreover, that 
order and the right of plaintiff thereunder was con-
firmed by the judgment in this case and there was in-
cluded in the judgment herein interest on the stipulated 
amount from the date of the order putting plaintiff in 
possession, the judgment by relation becoming effective 
for that purpose as of the date of the order for im-
mediate occupation. Plaintiff's title to these waters 
under defendants' interpretation of the decision of this 
court in Utah Copper Company vs. Montana-Bingham 
Consolidated Mining Company, supra, would depend 
upon plaintiff's acquisition of the right to convey those 
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waters across Tract D. Having acquired that right in 
this suit by court order granting immediate occupation 
for that purpose, confirmed by the judgment herein, 
it cannot be said that plaintiff has ''suffered or permit-
ted" those waters to "seep and percolate through the 
soil and earth of the defendants' claims * on 
or in which it has no surface or other rights." There-
fore those solutions continued the property of the plain-
tiff, did not leave plaintiff's estate and did not become 
the property of the defendants, and those solutions 
have accordingly been kept constantly in the possession 
of the plaintiff and constantly upon and within plain-
tiff's property pursuant to the easements hereby ac-
quired. 
(C) 
Point 
Defendants' law point number 3 relating to the stipu-
lation for the order for immediate occupation-Appellants' 
Brief, pages 67 to 103. 
The above occupies a substantial part of appellants' 
brief and is a remarkable discussion. Oounsel assigned 
error upon the findings and conclusions, but direct the 
greater part of their argument against the memorandum 
of the court. We are not here concerned with what 
might have been the plaintiff's liability had plaintiff 
been denied the right to condemn the easements sought. 
We have no intention of debating that question with 
'Counsel, for neither finding nor conclusion can be found 
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upon what might have been the liability of the parties 
had the judgment been for the defendants instead of the 
plaintiff. In our opinion such is not within the scope 
of this court's present inquiry. When a court of com-
petent jurisdiction shall have adjudged that the copper 
solutions plaintiff has received in its intake in Dixon 
Gulch were the property of the defendants, then will 
be time enough to discuss an accounting-we are not 
now interested in matters of accounting. The other 
phase of that discussion, namely, counsel's defense that 
the stipulation "without prejudice" and the court's 
order for immediate occupation thereupon are ws though 
neither stipulation nor order had been made at all, is 
within the scope of this court's inquiry and w~; will 
direct and limit our discussion accordingly. 
We confess to considerable difficulty in compre-
hending counsel's conception of their stipulation and 
its effect. It must always have been apparent to coun-
sel that our only purpose in entering into that stipula-
tion was for the court order for immediate occupation, 
and that the only purpose for which that order could 
have been made was to vest in plaintiff the right pend-
ing the action to enter into possession of the premises 
sought to be condemned, and devote them to the uses 
for which they were sought. rrhe defendants protected 
themselves against loss in the event plaintiff were not 
permitted to condemn by exacting from plaintiff a bond 
in the amount of $10,000.00, and plaintiff complied with 
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that condition, furnished the bond accordingly, the order 
then being made as contemplated by the stipulation. 
The result for which counsel now contend would be so 
incongruous as to be ridiculous. It had not occurred to 
either the court or ourselves that we were being imposed 
upon. Counsel should have had more regard for our 
credulity. Counsel should not have permitted us to 
collect and divert those copper solutions ever since 
June 13, 1928, and in our facilities to have precipitated 
the copper from them and marketed it in the belief 
that the court order gave us possession for that purpose 
pending the action, only to inform us that all we had 
done was for defendants' sole account, that the stipu-
lation and order were always void because in our 
credulity and ignorance we had so st1pulated. Counsel 
argue that they had known it all the time, because they 
had expressly so stipulated, and that because we con-
tended and the court below held, that by the order result-
ing from the stipulation, the plaintiff had been put into 
possession for all the purposes within the contemplation 
of the suit and had continued therein pursuant to that 
right to and including judgment, that we were "cute" 
and "tricky," and guilty of "legal legerdemain,"-
''as cute, as tricky, a piece of legal legerdemain, as the 
annals of the law disclose"! (Appellants' Brief, page 
97.) In common with many members of the bench and 
bar, we have received upon various occa:sions from one 
of defendants' counsel bits of humor for which he has 
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acquired a reputation, and it had occurred to us that 
possibly in the writing of pages 67 to 103 of their brief 
counsel had made a supreme effort of that character. 
But the result does not do him justice. 
Neither stipulation nor order has been prejudicial 
to defendants on the trial-no more than are such orders 
under the statutes and the decisions of this court. 
The stipulation, however, was a consent to the making 
of the order and the order gave to plaintiff the right 
pending the action to occupy the premises and put them 
to the uses for which plaintiff sought t,o condemn them. 
By the judgment, that permission was confirmed, the 
judgment included interest upon the amount from the 
date of occupation under that order and plaintiff con-
tinues in possession of the premises accordingly. We 
do not now and never have claimed more for either 
stipulation or order. There was only one purpose for 
which that order was or could have been made and that 
was to vest in the plaintiff the right pending the action 
to enter into the possession of the premises sought to 
be condemned and devote them to the uses for which 
they were sought. Counsel would have this court con-
elude that the parties made this stipulation, that plain-
tiff in compliance with its requirements had pur-
chased a bond with corporate surety in the amount of 
$10,000.00, paid the annual premium of $100.00 there-
upon year after year, and the court below had made 
its order putting plaintiff into possession accordingly, 
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all to no accomplishment whatever, that although both 
stipulation and order expressly provided for the right 
to enter into possession and use of the premises, and 
the order in addition granted express injunctive relief 
against hindrance or interference with that right, still 
that all of that was meaningless and futile, that plain-
tiff was nevertheless a trespasser, because it provided 
in the stipulation that it should be ''otherwise'' without 
prejudice. Such an argument is worthy of no com-
ment. 
(D) 
Point 
The copper solutions flowing at the so-called Hays 
Spring flow from plaintiff's dumps down Dixon Gulch in a 
channel or course definitely known and positively defined, 
and those copper solutions are not now and never were 
percolating waters within the legal definition of such. 
These copper solutions while in plaintiff's dumps 
are the personal property of plaintiff, the very corpus 
of which plaintiff owns, just as plaintiff owns the ores 
and other material in its dump, Utah Copper Company 
v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, 
69 Utah at pages 430 and 431, where the court held: 
* * * we are of the opinion that the 
waters carrying copper or other minerals in solu-
tion, so long as they are in the dump and thus 
a part of it, * * * are, like the dump itself, 
the property of the plaintiff; that it is as law-
ful for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are 
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in the dump, to collect and remove them as it 
is to remove the dump itself; * * * 
and such they continue to be as they percolate through 
the natural soil upon the surface beneath the dump aml 
thence along bedrock over a channel plaintiff occupie-; 
by court order for that purpose to plaintiff's intake. 
Their character is unchanged, the personal property vf 
plaintiff always identified, never abandoned and never 
have they become true percolating waters. 
Title to such water while in plaintiff's dump before 
processes of nature have converted it into the valuable 
copper solution that defendants so much desire, is in 
plaintiff, and after these natural processes have con-
verted the water, the property of plaintiff, into a thing 
of value in the form of a copper solution, by leaching 
out and carrying in such solution the valuable copper 
in plaintiff's dump, also the property of plaintiff, the 
solution continues to be and is plaintiff's property. This 
copper solution is an artificial product composed of in-
gredients all of which are the property of plaintiff. 
That solution is a definite, definable and identified 
substance from a known source, the property of plaintiff, 
and as it falls upon the the surface beneath the dump, 
trickles, seeps and flows on and above bedrock in the 
bottom of the gulch over the channel plaintiff has 
condemned across defendants' property, it is still such 
definable, identified substance, tracea'ble and tratced 
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from such known source wherein it was the property 
of plaintiff, wherein the copper was the property of 
plaintiff, admitted to he such by defendants, the pro-
duct of plaintiff's industry, mined by plaintiff, trans-
ported and deposited upon that dump by plaintiff and 
now as plaintiff's property collected by plaintiff in its 
intake and conveyed away to plaintiff's precipitating 
plant, where the copper therein contained, plaintiff's 
property, derived from plaintiff's dumps, is being pre-
served for plaintiff, its owner. 
Particularly is title to these copper soultions in 
the plaintiff, because plaintiff, pursuant to the order 
of the court below is now and has been at all times 
with which we are concerned conveying them from the 
boundary line of plaintiff's premises over and across 
the premises of defendants in a channel that is known 
and defined, poRsession of which for that purpose has 
been given plaintiff by the order for immediate occupa-
tion made by the court below, followed by the judgment 
and final order of condemnation herein. 
We find an interesting case in that of Los Angeles v. 
Pomeroy 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585 (error dismissed 
without passing upon merits in 188 U. S. 314, 47 L. Ed. 
487, 63 L. R. A. 471, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395). In that 
case the City of Los Angeles sought to condemn 315 
acres of land that was saturated with water, at the 
lower end of which it was proposed to construct a sub-
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surface dam, thereby ra1smg the plane of saturation, 
whereupon it was proposed to tap this heavily satur-
ated bed of sand and gravel by means of a tunnel con-
structed with lateral galleries, through which the water 
could be drained off and eonducted to the municipal 
supply pipes. It was contended there was no authority 
in law for the condemnation of that land for that pur-
pose. The court held, however, that the land was 
* * * to be used as a reservoir, such as 
essentially it is, and none the less so because the 
water does not rise and stand above the sur-
face. The evidence in the case shows that from 
one-fifth to one-third of the entire bulk of the 
material filling the valley below the plane of 
saturation is water. The land in its natural 
state, therefore, is a reservoir, and a subsurface 
dam is to be constructed in order to make it 
better serve the purposes of a reservoir. Such 
being the usc to which it is to be devoted, the 
fee simplr may he taken. Code Civ. Proc. § 1239; 
St. 1891, p. 102. 
That part of § 1239, Code of Civil Procedure, m 
which we are interested is as follows: 
The following is a classification of the 
estates and rights in lands subject to be taken 
for public use: 
1. A FEE SrMPLE, when taken for public 
buildings or grounds, or for permanent buildings, 
for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flood-
ing occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a 
flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or 
tailings of a mine. 
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That se'Ction was early enacted into the statutes 
of Utah. § 7331, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, is 
identical with the above except that in the Utah statute 
there were added the following words-
mill, smelter or other place for thP reduction of 
ores. 
The Utah se1ction was amended in 1919 (Chapter 
126 Laws of Utah 1919, page 846) when the following 
proviso was added : 
* * * provided, that where surface 
ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other 
deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extrac-
tion, a perpetual casement may be taken for the 
surface ground over such deposits. 
By the decision in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, supra, 
"the land in its natural state therefore is a reservoir" 
and is "none the less so because the water does not 
rise and stand above the surface.'' 
The court in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy also defined 
a ''subterranean stream'' as follows: 
* * * it will be convenient to first dis-
pose of the main question in the case, viz., the 
proper definition of a subterranean stream. 
There is no dispute between the parties, and no 
conflict in the authorities, as to the proposition 
that subterranean streams flowing through known 
and definite channels are governecl by the same 
rules that apply to surface streams. * * * 
the law, as applicable to the present case, IS 
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well eptiomized in section 48 of Kinney on Irri-
gation, as follows: 
'Subterranean or underground water courses 
are, as their names indicate, those water cur-
rents that flow under the surface of the earth. 
* * * In and near the mountains many streams 
have a bed which was originally a rocky canon, 
but has been filled up with boulders and coarse 
gravel. In this debris a large portion or all of 
the water sinks from sight, to reappear only 
when some rocky reef crosses the channel and 
forces the water to the surface. 'l'he movement 
of this water through the porous gravel, owing 
to the declivity of the stream, is often quite rapid, 
and a considerable volume may thus pass down 
the channel hidden from sight. These water 
courses are divided into two distinct classes,-
thosc whose channels arc known or defined, and 
those unknown and undefined. * * * the word 
'defined' means a contracted and bounded chan-
nel, * * * and the word 'known' refers to 
knowledge of the course of the stream by reason-
able inference. '* * ,,, ' In this case the 
boundaries of the ehanncl and the existence and 
course of the underground stream were unknown 
and undefined, except so far as they could be in-
ferred; but there was a great amount of evi-
dence from which a reasonable inference could 
be drawn that the channel was bounded and de-
fined by the sloping sides of the Cahuenga and 
Verdugo hills meeting underground, * * * 
The trial court had given the following instruction, 
which was approved by the supreme court of Cali-
fornia: 
(20) If you find from the evidence that 
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the lands sought to be condemned are situated 
at the lower portion of, and form a part of, 
the San J<~ernando basin or watershed, near or at 
its outlet, and that said basin is abont twenty-
four miles long and about twelve miles wide at 
the widest point, and that said outlet is from 
two thousand feet to three miles wide, and bound-
ed and defined on the southern side by the rock 
of the Cahuenga range, and on its northern side 
by a similar rock of the Verdugo hills, and that 
the earth of which the basin is geuerally com-
posed, including said outlet and the land sought 
to be condemned, is an alluvial or other deposit 
made up of loam, sand, gravel, and boulders, 
mixed together and interspersed \vith broken 
or irregular strata or masses of clay or cemented 
sand and gravel, and lying in place as originally 
deposited by the forces of nature, and that as the 
same lies in place the natural voids or interstices 
of such earth generally throughout the basin, 
including the defendants' lands and said out-
let, are equal to from one-fifth to one-third of 
the bulk of the entire mass, and that such entire 
deposit lies upon a grade or slope towards and 
through the outlet of such basin, and that all 
the water falling in the watershed of such basin, 
which is not lost in storm, run off, or by evapor-
ation, or in supporting plant life, or held im-
movable in the ground, sinks into the earth 
composing such basin, and thence by force of 
gravity moves down through such voids or na-
tural interstices of the earth throughout the 
greater portion of the entire mass to the outlet 
of the basin, through which it passes, * * * 
if such water does collect underground and flow 
in certain courses or channels through coarse, 
permeable material therein, where the existence 
and general course of the flowing or moving 
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body of water can be easily determined, then 
the water so moving in such channels would con-
stitute a water course, although not visible on the 
surface, and although the space through which 
the channel extends may be largely filled with 
the material through which the water flows. * * * 
Counsel apparently are of the opinion that all waters 
that percolate are percolating waters within the legal 
definition, and that percolating waters do not "flow" 
in defined and known channels, but there is nothing in 
the cases counsel cites or in any others of which we are 
aware that justifies such a conclusion. In the case 
annotated it is said at page 1381 of 55 A. L. R. that 
percolating waters 
* * * may flow in a well-defined channel and 
be such as, if on the surface, would answer the 
description of a watercourse, but, in order to 
be subject to the law of surface water, the ex-
istence, location, and flow of the water must 
be known to the owner of the land through whie11 
it flows, or it must be discoverable from the 
surface of the earth. * * * Furthermore, 
'the knowledge required * * * must be knowl-
edge by reasona1ble inference, from existing and 
observed facts in the natural or rather pre-
existing condition of the surface of the ground.' 
* * * 
Upon the same page appears the following quota-
tion from 27 R. C. L. at page 1170, § 90: 
The distinction between rights in surface 
and in subterranean streams is not founded on 
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the fact of their location above or below ground, 
but on the fact of knowledge, actual or acquir-
able, of their existence, location and course, and 
the court's endeavor, so far as practicable, to 
apply the rules of law applicable to surface 
streams or bodies of water existing in well-de-
fined channels to the like streams or bodies 
existing underground. 
See also Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights 
(2d ed.) Vol. 2 §§ 1155, 1156, at pages 2098 to 2101, 
and Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 Pac. 755, 156 Cal. 
603. 
These copper solutions flow down Dixon Gulch 
through the railroad fill and come to the surface of, 
from and out of the railroad fill, along a course and in 
a channel thoroughly well-known and perfectly defined. 
No one is interested whether or not in their flow within 
this channel and along this well-known and defined 
course they seep and percolate. Mr. Goodrich was 
quite accurate when he testified as follows: 
I would say that Dixon Gulch is a well de-
fined channel. * * * The entire gulch is a 
well defined channel. I would say the waters 
that come through the fill and find their way 
into tract D come through in a well defined chan-
nel. The channel is all of tract D; they come 
through everywhere in all of that area. During 
the low season of the year I believe the particular 
part of tract D where they came through is the 
bottom of gulch, * * * they would also flow 
through the drain tunnel. Except in the drain 
tunnel and the bottom of the gulch they would 
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not come through any other place at low water 
season in commercial quantities. ('l'r. :329) * * * 
I say that in low water a flow like it is now that 
substantially all of the water will come through 
the drain tunnel or come down underneath and 
flow into the old channel of Dixon Gulch; it will 
come down the bottom of the gulch. (Tr. 330) 
• • • 
At the outset in the trial of this case, in the course 
of counsel's argument upon defendants' motion for a 
non-suit, it was the defendants' theory that plaintiff 
could "condemn a right through our land so that they 
may go up into their lands and collect their water. 
'rhat is all right; they can do that;" (Tr. 700) But the 
only difference between that and what the plaintiff is 
doing in this case is that by the course counsel sug-
gest, plaintiff would have conveyed a part at least of 
its copper solutions over and across the defendants' 
lands along on top of bedrock in an artificial channel 
the plaintiff at great risk and expense would have 
cleared beneath the railway fill, just as plaintiff pro-
posed to do with relation to its Tiewaukee dump. The 
solutions would then have flowed in the same channel 
as those on bedrock in the bottom of Dixon Gulch, if 
any, now o,ccupy. We do not understand that the fact 
that plaintiff had driven a tunnel on bedrock up be-
neath the fill for these waters would bring the plaintiff's 
effort within the statute, but that otherwise, regardless 
of the public use to which the tract were devoted, title 
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to those waters would nevertheless vest in the defend-
ants under the law applicable to surface waters. The 
statute does not require the condemner as a condition 
precedent to condemnation to clear the channel and 
then by a condition subsequent forfeit the right ac-
quired when the channel shall contain large boulders. 
What the cleaning of the channel has to do with plain-
tiff's right to condemn, so long as the channel shall be 
put to the uses within the contemplation of the statute, 
is quite beyond our comprehension. It can be of no 
importance whether the channel were artificial or as 
nature made it, under the authorities it makes not the 
slightest difference that this ditch shall have been filled 
up to the top of the mountains by the railroad fill, if, 
notwithstanding, it shall still serve the purpose of a 
ditch, shall still be devoted to the uses for which the 
statute authorizes the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain. In Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, supra, the pass 
between the Oahuenga range and the Verdugo hiUs 
was on the surface from one and one-half to two and 
one-half miles in width, ''and that in its borings have 
been made over 100 feet in depth before encountering 
bedrock.'' But the court held: 
but here is not only water moving in a definite 
direction, but also sides and bed to the channel 
in which it is moving, and these, also, are com-
prehended in the court's definition of a subter-
ranean stream. 
Is this narrow channel in the bottom of Dixon 
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Gulch, occupying as it does the whole of Tract D, any 
less known and defined'? 
The copper solutions that pass from plaintiff's 
dumps to its intake through the railroad fill never be-
come the property of the defendants because never upon, 
within or a part of defendants' estate. Copper solu-
tions that at some time in their course to plaintiff's in-
take flow upon bedrock or upon the natural surface soil 
of the defendants' premises beneath the fill, or through 
the railroad fill, flow in a known and defined channel 
identified by the precipitous walls of the gulch and its 
bedrock bottom, and well known, a channel not only so 
definitely known and positively defined, but one that 
is in the possession of plaintiff pursuant to court order 
for immediate occupation and the suc,ceeding judgment, 
and is being devoted by plaintiff to plaintiff's use for 
the pul'!poses for which plaintiff seeks to condemn it, 
purposes within the express provisions of the statutes 
authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
(E) 
Point 
Plaintiff possesses the power to condemn Tract D for 
the purposes alleged. 
Tract D is sought in its natural state for a natural 
outlet for the copper waters flowing from plaintiff's 
dumps in Dixon Gulch, out of which mineral deposit 
there is constantly being leached plaintiff's copper con-
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tained in plaintiff's ores that compose those dumps, 
whi,ch copper is carried in solution down Dixon Gulch 
to the intake for which plaintiff seeks to condemn Tract 
C. '_l1raet D is sought in its natural state for a ditch, 
flume, aqueduct or conduit to facilitate the reduction 
of ores and the working of this mineral deposit con-
sisting of plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch. It is of 
course conceded that plaintiff is the owner of these 
dumps and of all copper solutions while in the dumps 
and while in or on plaintiff's land upon which the 
dumps have been deposited. Plaintiff is the owner of 
the whole drainage area of Dixon Gulch down to the 
tboundary line of the Valentine Scrip. Tract D lies 
in the bottom of the gulch at its narrowest point, which 
is upon the Valentine Scrip. The right plaintiff seeks 
to condemn therefore is merely that to convey copper 
solutions, conceded to be plaintiff's property at the 
Valentine Scrip boundary, across a part of the Valen-
tine Scrip to plaintiff's intake, where they are being 
and will be collected and conveyed thence to plaintiff's 
precipitating plant, where plaintiff's copper is recover-
ed from plaintiff's copper waters and disposed of by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's right to take Tracts A, B, C and G for 
the respeetive purposes pleaded not being resisted, this 
appeal is concerned with Tract D only, i. e., with plain-
tiff's effort to condemn Tract D in its natural state for 
a natural outlet for the copper waters flowing from the 
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plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch and for a ditch, flume, 
aqueduct or conduit to facilitate the reduction of ores 
in, and the working of plaintiff's mineral deposit cou-
sisting of, plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch. There are 
constantly in operation in those dumps forces accomp-
lishing the gradual leaching of plaintiff's copper from 
plaintiff's ores there deposited and the carrying away 
in solution of plaintiff's copper so leached from plain-
tiff's ores, the dumps yielding a steady stream of cop-
per waters that flow down the gulch and through the 
railroad fill of the Bingham & Garfield Railroad. Un-
less plaintiff be permitted to recover its property as 
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff's copper solutions will flow 
thence on down into Bingham Creek and to waste, or 
into the possession of others who, like the defendants 
in this case, neither own them nor have any right, title 
or interest in them. 
By order of the court below on June 13, 1928, made 
upon the stipulation of the parties hereinbefore dis-
cussed, plaintiff entered into possession of Tract D 
and the remainder of the premises sought to be con-
demned, constructed plaintiff's diversion facilities and 
thereafter diverted those waters to plaintiff's precipi-
tating plant, where their copper content has since been 
and is being precipitated. The defendants are not in 
possession of the surface area within Tract D, nor have 
they been since 1910 when by the conveyances and con-
demnation decree hereinbefore mentioned the railway 
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company acquired its railroad easements. The occupa-
tion of the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company is 
from the nature of its use exclusive, and has continued 
so since these conveyances and the condemnation decree. 
Has the plaintiff in this action the right to con-
demn Tract D for the purposes stated? That is the 
only question this court is called upon to determined. 
Plaintiff derives its right to exercise the power of 
eminent domain by virtue of Chapter 65, Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1917, and by that act and its predecessor acts 
from which it was evolved, mining generally in the State 
of Utah was declared to be a public use in aid of which 
private individuals and private corporations may exer-
cise the power of eminent domain. That it was the 
intention of the legislature by these statutes to declare 
mining generally a public use in the State of Utah is 
apparent from a reading of § 7330. The enumeration 
contained in that section with relation to mining includes 
every mining activity of which the most fertile imagina-
tion ,could conceive. While the purpose for which plain-
tiff here seeks to condemn Tract D is expressly within 
that enumeration, still, were that not the fact, the pur-
pose for which plaintiff now seeks to condemn Tract 
D being in furtherance of plaintiff's mining operations, 
plaintiff would under this statute possess the power to 
condemn as herein prayed, because mining generally in 
this state is the public use in aid of which that power 
has been granted by the statute. 
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It may happen some .day that a situation will arise 
in the conduct of mining operations in this state in one 
of their many aspects that a mining company may find 
it necessary to exercise the power of eminent domain 
for a use not precisely designated <by the statute, but 
necessary to the recovery or preservation of its prop-
erty, hence in furtherance of its mining operations. A 
mining company may, for instance, find a neighbor bent 
upon seizing its property, the latter occupying a position 
from which the mining company if denied the right 
of eminent domain must suffer the neighbor's continued 
appropriation of the mining company's property, this 
for no other reason than that the then state of the law 
afforded the owner of the property no relief, but when 
that time shall come, mining generally in the state of 
Utah will of course be again declared to be the public 
use in aid of which the power of eminent domain may 
be exercised, and that although the precise purpose for 
which it shall then have become necessary to exercise 
the power be not expressly enumerated in the statute, 
the courts will hold that mining being the use for the 
furtherance of which the power was granted, mining 
will be the justification for its exercise, whether or not 
the precise purpose then served be included in the 
statutory enumeration. 
It is be,cause the mining industry in the State of 
Utah is of such vital concern to its people, so eBsential 
to the public welfare, that those engaged in that in-
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dustry have been endowed by the statute with the power 
of eminent domain when exercised in furtherance of the 
mining industry. Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strick-
ley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296. Affirmed 200 U. S. 525. 
Should it become necessary to the efficient conduct of 
any phase of one's mining operations to acquire an 
easement over a tract of land for use in its natural 
state as a canal whereby water might be conveyed for 
that use, are the courts to microscopically scrutinize 
the enumeration contained in § 7330 and deny the right 
merely because by definition a canal is a thing artificial, 
not as nature made it, that the power might be exer-
cised for the construction of a canal but not to con-
demn the land in its natural state to serve as such, this 
for no better reason than that the enumeration did 
not include the appropriation of land in its natural state 
for that purpose? Are considerations of public wel-
fare served if the channel be an artificial one, but not 
served if the channel be as nature made it? Such reason-
mg is nonsense. 
It is said m Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strick-
ley, supra: 
* * * The mining industry in this state, 
and in others similarly situated, not only pro-
duces a home market for products of the farm, 
and furnishes thousands of men with steady em-
ployment at liberal and remunerative wages, but 
also produces wealth which has enabled other 
industries to be created and to flourish, which, 
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without the stimulus thus furnished, would lan-
guish. * * * We have in this state in addi-
tion to the extensive deposits of gold, silver, lead, 
and copper ores, large areas of lands containing 
'Coal in almost limitless quantities, and we de-
pend almost exclusively upon the coal mines for 
the fuel used in our manufacturing establishments 
and for domestic purposes. Now, it is of vital 
importance to the people that the coal, as well as 
the other hidden resources of the state, be opened 
up and developed, and that the mining industry 
in general, which has been the source of so much 
wealth to the people of this and other Western 
states, be conducted on the same extensive scale 
in the future that has characterized its operations 
in the past. Therefore the public policy of the 
state, as exemplified by the act of the Legisla-
ture under consideration, is to encourage the 
people to open up and exploit the mines with 
which the state abounds, and thereby not only 
give to the state the wealth which will enable other 
industries to be created, but furnish thousands 
of laborers with remunerative employment. 
In a later decision, this time in Monetaire M. Co. 
v. Columbus Rexall Oonsol. M. Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 
Pac. 172, the supreme court of this state again similarly 
declared itself, that time as follows: 
Mr. Lindley, in discussing the right of emi-
nent domain as applied to mining, in his excellent 
work on Mines, in volume 1 (3d ed.) p. 612 says: 
'It is manifest, however, that there is a 
marked tendency, evolutionary in its nature, to 
break away from the old rigid rules on the subject 
of 'public use,' and to enlarge the definition of the 
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term, so as to make it synonymous with 'public 
welfare.' This tendency is no doubt influenced to 
some extent by the growth and spread of so-
ciological ideas which seck to influence the con-
struction of constitutions and statutes in the it:-
tercst of the group instead of the individual, and 
to authorize the condemnation of private property 
for any use which stimulates or encourages the 
development of the natural resources of the coun-
try. * * * But the test of 'public welfare' 
instead of the old doctrine of 'public usc' is being 
gradually extended, with the promise of its be-
coming the prevailing doctrine in most juris-
dictions.' 
And then the court concluded: 
It is too late now to insist thai the people 
of both the state and nation are not interested 
in and benefited by the development of the min-
eral resources and wealth of both the state and 
the nation. The people are likewise interested 
in having the mineral resources developed at as 
little cost and expense as possible, since in no 
other way can the ores of the lower grades be 
developed and mined. 
We do not serve public welfare, considerations of 
which gave birth to the eminent domain statute, by 
quibbling over the definition of words employed in the 
enumeration in § 7330, by shutting our eyes to the pur-
pose served and de:ciding that land may be condemned 
for a canal artificially to be constructed, but that land 
in its natural state might not be condemned, although 
for precisely the same usc. That would be absurd. 
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In the case at bar the precise situation suggested 
m Highland Boy Gold M. Co. v. Strickley, supra, does 
not arise. We do not have a neighbor who seeks an 
exorbitant payment for a right of way over his property. 
We go one step further in this case; here the plaintiff 
has a neighbor who has concluded that if he can block 
plaintiff's attempt to divert and preserve plaintiff's 
copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps, those solutions 
will become his property; he argues that after the solu-
tions have passed from plaintiff's land over the bound-
ary line and upon defendant's property, title has passed 
to defendant, this although by court order plaintiff has 
been given permission to carry its copper solutions 
from its property so over and across the property 
of defendants. Therefore the defendants insist that, 
the solutions being theirs, defendants are entitled to a 
judgment of some hundreds of thousands of dollars if 
plaintiff he permitted to condemn and so appropriate 
these copper waters, but that plaintiff should not be 
permitted to condemn because the solutions belong to 
defendants, and defendants can precipitate from them 
their copper content as well as can plaintiff, thus put-
ting them to the same public use. In all this the de-
fendants admit title to these copper solutions in plain-
tiff whil~ upon plaintiff's land, and defendants further 
concede that had plaintiff sought to condemn an ease-
ment for a tunnel or other artificial canal through de-
fendants' property, through which to divert the cop-
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per solutions, the solutions although running along this 
artificial canal across defendants' property would con-
tinue plaintiff's property, would not become the prop-
erty of defendants-in other words, if the canal be 
artificial, title to the copper solutions will not pass to 
the defendants, but if the course be over the ground 
in its natural state, title will pass to the defendants, 
notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff is taking its 
water over the latter course by the order of this court 
putting plaintiff in possession for that purpose, and 
even notwithstanding in this proceeding plaintiff per-
manently acquire the right by the actual condemnation 
of that natural water course, ditch, outlet or whatever 
it may be called. That method of reasoning is indeed 
fantastic; were it to be generally indulged neither 
property rights nor one's intellectual equilibrium could 
survive, to say nothing of the public welfare. 
Mining generally in the State of Utah is the public 
use in aid of which the exercise by the plaintiff of the 
right of eminent domain may be justified, mining 
generally, not certain of its incidents, but all of them. 
That is apparent from the statute and the statute has 
been so interpreted by this court. In Monetaire M. Co. 
v. Columbus Rexall Consol. M. Co., supra, the court 
held: 
* * * In examining all of the subdivisions 
of section 3588 (§ 7330 Comp. L. HH7) and of 
section 3590, one becomes convinced that it was 
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the intention of the legislative power of this 
state to declare mining generally and the develop-
ment of mines and mineral deposits a public 
use, in furtherance of which the right of the ex-
ercise of eminent domain was applied with full 
force and effeet. This is apparent from the 
first enactment of the law of eminent domain as 
found in Laws Utah 1884, tit. 7, p. 348. Section 
3588 has been amended and extended in some 
particulars ever since title 7 of 1884 was en-
acted. 
Not only did the court in that case hold that in 
this state mining generally was the public use in aid of 
which the right of eminent domain could be exercised, 
but that such use having been by the statute declared 
a public use, the statute must be given a broad and 
liberal interpretation in its application to that use and 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain with re-
lation thereto. The court held: 
The intention of the Legislature to extend 
the right of eminent domain to mines and mining 
being clear and unequivo'cal, what is the rule 
respecting the construction and application that 
should he given to the acts of the Legislature 
in granting the right of eminent domain for thr~ 
uses and purposes contemplated in the Act? "" "" ·~ 
We think it is generally agreed that where 
the right of eminent domain is granted for a 
particular purpose, then the statute must be 
given a liberal construction in furtherance of 
such purpose. Our statute, in clear and explic:t 
terms, grants the right of eminent domain for 
the purpose of developing the mining industry 
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and for the purpose of developing the mineral 
resources of the state, regardless of ownership. 
Under those circumstances, therefore, the rule 
of construction that is applied by Mr. J m;tice 
Hawley in the case of Douglas v. Byrnes (C. C.) 
59 Fed. 28, 8hould be applied. Mr. Justice Haw-
ley, in passing upon the eminent domain act of 
the State of Nevada respecting the development 
of mines (C. C.) 59 Fed. at page :n, says: 
'The power of the Legislature, having 
been fully recognized and sanctioned, the 
purpose of the act should not ht~ hampered 
by any narrow or technical objections. 
The importance of encouraging the mining 
industry of this state must be kept in view. 
This was the object, intent, and purpose 
of the Legislature in passing the act, and 
its wisdom, policy, and expediency was 
thereby determined. A reasonable, fair, 
just, broad, and liberal view should be 
taken by the court in interpreting ib pro-
visions.' 
The purpose for which plaintiff here seeks to con-
demn Tract D is expressly within the enumeration in 
§ 7330. Eliminating from this section what obviously 
does not apply to plaintiff's effort here, carefully pre-
serving each provision without distortion, we will have 
the follownig: 
7330. (G588). Exercised in behalf of what 
uses. Subject to the provisions of this ehapter, 
the right of eminent domain may be exorcised in 
behalf of the following public uses: 
2. * * all public uses authorized by the 
legislature; 
* * * 
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5. * * * canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, 
aqueducts, and pipes for the supplying * * 
mines, mills, smelters, or other works for the re-
duction of ores with water * * * 
6. * * * tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, 
* * * to facilitate the milling, * * or other 
reduction of ores, or the working of mines, * * * 
or mineral deposits; outlets, natural or other-
wise, for * * water from mills, * * or 
other works for the reduction of ores; or from 
mines, * * or mineral deposits; * * also 
any occupancy in common by the owners or pos-
sessors of different mines, * * * mineral de-
posits, mills, * * * or other places for the 
reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, de-
posit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
• • • 
We are at once confronted by the express designa-
tion in paragraph 6 of § · 7330 of "outlets, natural or 
otherwise, for * * * water from mills * * * or 
other works for the reduction of ores; or from mmes 
* * * or mineral deposits;'' and that is sufficiently 
precise and explicit to afford plaintiff abundant author-
ity for its condemnation of 'rract D for use as herein 
specified, although an express provision of the statute 
were required and the statute had not been judicially 
construed as we have indicated. If there ever were a 
natural outlet for the waters from a mineral deposit 
Tract D is such an outlet for the copper waters from 
plaintiff's copper ore dumps or mineral deposit in 
Dixon Gulch. It does not require a stretch of the 
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imagination to construe as "works for the reduction 
of ores" plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, where the 
ores have been deposited and are there being exposed 
to the oxidixing influences of the air and meteoric wa-
ters and thus induced to surrender their copper content 
in the form of copper solutions that flow over and across 
Tract D, a natural outlet. 
Plaintiff's precipitating plant near the mouth of 
Bingham Canyon, to which all of these copper waters 
are conveyed and where their copper content is precipi-
tated, comes within the definition of "works for the re-
duction of ores." Therein water is necessary, for the 
copper cannot be leached from the ores in plaintiff's 
dumps or mineral deposit except through the medium of 
water, cannot be conveyed from those dumps or that 
mineral deposit except through the medium of water, 
which picks up and conveys the copper in solution from 
the dumps or mineral deposit over and across Tract 
D, the natural outlet, and thence to plaintiff's precipi-
tating plant, where one phase of the process of reduc-
tion is concluded. Therefore the plaintiff is within the 
express provision of paragraph 5 of the enumeration 
contained in § 7330, whereby it is enacted that con-
demnation may be had for 
* * * canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aque-
ducts, and pipes for the supplying * * mines, mills, 
smelters, or other works for the reduction of 
ores with water * * 
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Paragraph 6 of § 7330 includes m its express 
enumeration-
tunnels, ditches, flumes, p1pes * * * to fa-
cilitate the milling * * * or other reduction 
of ores, or the working 
mineral deposits; 
of mines * * * or 
The condemnation of Tract D is "to facilitate the 
reduction of ores" and the "working of a mineral 
deposit''; it is a necessary link in the process, first, 
of oxidation and leaching, and secondly, in that of pre-
cipitation, all of which are necessary to the recovery 
from plaintiff's ores or mineral deposit of their cop-
per content. 
But counsel argue that the plaintiff does not come 
within these provisions of the statute because there 
neither is nor will be a ditch, flume or conduit across 
Tmct D, counsel assuming that the ground in its na-
tural state could not become a ditch, flume or conduit. 
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's Revision) 
Vol. 1, page 591, we find the following definition of the 
word ditch: 
DrTcH. The words 'd]tch' and 'drain' have 
no technical or exact meaning. They both may 
mean a hollow place in the g-round, natural or 
artificial, where water is collected or passes off. 
5 Gray 64. 
and in 14 Cyc. 552, the following: 
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DITCH. * * * A hollow space in the ground, 
natural or artificial, where water is collected or 
passes off. 
In Smith v. Hampshire, 4 Cal. App. 8, 87 Pac. 
224, which was a case involving an asserted right by 
prescriptive use to the continued use of an artifically 
excavated ditch for the conveyance of water for irri-
gation, the court defined a ditch as "no more than a 
right of way for the passage of water.'' 
Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N. C. 345, 70 S. E. 834, was 
a case to define a boundary by the following descrip-
tion contained in a deed: 
Beginning at the head of a ditch on the En-
field and Tarboro Road, about equidistant from 
the buildings on the land of J. H. Cutchin and 
(those on) the Nevill place, running with said 
ditch in an eastern direction to a branch; thence 
with said branch to the edge of Griffin Swamp; 
thence due east to the canal; and thence by 
various calls to the beginning. 
There was more than one ditch and the facts called 
for a definition of the word "ditch." The court defined 
the term as follows: 
Tho words 'ditch' or 'urain have no technical 
or exact meaning. They both may mean a hollow 
or open space in the ground, natural or artificial, 
where water is collected or passes off * * * 
quoting from Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, 71 Mass. 
( 5 Gray) 61. 
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In Sefton v. Prentice, 103 Cal. 670, 37 Pac. 641, 
at 642, the court defined the terms with which we are 
here concerned as follows: 
'Conduit' is a general word, which applies 
to any channel or structure by which flowing 
water ·can be conducted from one point to an-
other. It includes a ditch, flume, pipe, or any 
kind of aqueduct. 
'fhe case of Ange & Forest v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co., 159 N. C. 547, 75 S E. 796, was one requiring 
a definition of the word "canal" as used in the statute, 
and the court held that as there used ''the term 'ditch' 
and 'canal' is used indiscriminately to designate an 
artificial drain.'' The court then continued: 
In the ordinary acceptation of the terms, 
both indicate a channel constructed for the pur-
pose of conveying water, tho only difference be-
ing that the word 'canal' suggests a channel of 
larger dimensions than does the word .'ditch,' but 
as defined by the authorities a ditch may be 
natural or artificial * * * while a canal is 
an artificial trench for confining water to a 
defined channel * * * or a trench or excava-
tion in the earth for conducting water and con-
fining it to narrow limits * * * 
We find the word "aqueduct" defined in the Cen-
tury Dictionary as follows: 
1. A conduit or channel for conducting 
water from one place to another. 
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In Webster's New International Dictionary, 1918, 
the word "conduit" 1s defined as follows : 
1. * * * a natural channel or passage 
•for 1conveying water * * * an aqueduct, 
canal or channel; 
The court below disposed of this question m the 
following convinoing manner: 
The other question is whether, assuming 
the facts to be as hereinbefore indicated, 'rract 
D is subject, nevertheless, to condemnation. The 
eourt concludes that in view of its finding rela-
tive to the source and course of the copper 
waters, it is. 
The tmct is subject to condemnation under 
the law, in the opinion of the court, as "A natural 
outlet for water from works for the reduction of 
ores," or as "A natural outlet from a mineral 
deposit." Just as the copper solution is water 
for the purpose of applying the law of water 
thereto so it is water in considering whether the 
statute may be construed as including it in the 
foregoing quoted phrases, even though plaintiff 
is seeking an outlet from the dump for the pur-
pose of conveying it and using it elsewhere 
rather than to get rid of it. The dump is either 
a mineral deposit or it constitutes an essential 
part of the works for the reduction of ore. The 
fact that the water used in one of the steps in 
its reduction is that which adventitiously falls 
thereon, rather than water turned on or poured 
on the dump would make no difference. Water 
from placer mining operations doubtless would 
come within such provision of the statute. If it 
would, then it would seem that water flowing 
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~ .. 
from the dump in question, if such water were 
poured from a bose or turned from another 
source thereon would, and it seems to the court 
that the artificial application of the water should 
make no diff ereuce. ( Abs. 593-4). 
(F) 
Point 
The taking is necessary to the use. 
This court very clearly defines "necessity" with 
relation to this subject in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 
v. Oregon Short Line Railway Company, ~3 Utah 474, 
at 484-5, as follows: 
It is also argued that no necessity has been 
shown to exist for the taking of the right of 
way. But it is shown that the respondent made 
a bona fide effort to agree with the appellant 
upon terms for the taking of the land sought, 
and that the latter refused to consider respon-
dent's proposition or to negotiate with it at all. 
The necessity, therefore, exists for the taking. 
It is not a question whether there is other land 
to be had that is equally available, but the ques-
tion is whether the land sought is needed for the 
construction of the public work. The necessity 
is shown to exist when it appears that it is neces-
sary to take the land by condemnation proceed-
ings in order to effectuate the purposes of the 
corporation. * * * The respondent has the 
right to determine when and where its telegraph 
line shall be built. It may be said to be a gen-
eral rule that, unless a corporation exercising 
the power of eminent domain acts in bad faith 
or is guilty of oppression, its discretion in the 
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sele-ction of land will not be interfered with. 
* * * With the degree of necessity or the ex-
tent which the property will advance the public 
purpose, the courts have nothing to do. * * * 
When the use is public, the necessity of ex-
pediency of appropriating any particular prop-
erty is not a subject of judicial cognizance. * * * 
The rule is similarly stated in 20 Corpus Juris 
632, as follows: 
* * * the grantee of the power, in the 
absence of legislative restriction, may determine 
the location of the land required, and such de-
termination will not be interfered with by the 
courts if it is made in good faith and is not 
caprieious or wantonly injurious * * * The 
landowner ·cannot raise the objection that there 
is no necessity for condemning his property be-
cause some other location might be made, or some 
other property obtained which would be more 
suitaJble. 
and counsel upon the oecasion of their argument of de-
fendant's motion for non-suit (Tr. 747) admitted that 
the rule as to necessity was correctly stated in Gold-
field Consol. M. & T. Co. v. Old Sandstrom A. G. Min. 
Co., 38 Nev. 426, 150 Pac. 313 and 318, as follows: 
The rule as to what is 'necessary' in con-
demnation proceedings was clearly stated by this 
court in the case of Overman S. M. Co. v. Cor-
·coran, 15 Nev. 147, where it is said: 
'Individuals, by securing a title to 
the barren lands adjacent to the mines, 
mills, or works, have it within their power, 
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by unreasonably refusing to part with 
their lands for a just and fair compen-
sation, which capital is always willing to 
give without litigation, to greatly em-
barrass, if not entirely defeat, the business 
of mining in such localities, and confirms 
the opinion there advanced that 'the min-
eral wealth of this state ought not to be 
left undeveloped for the want of any 
quantity of land actually necessary to en-
able the owner or owners of mines to con-
duct and carry on the business of mining.' 
The law does not contemplate that an 
'absolute necessity' should exist for the 
identical lands sought to be condemned. 
The selection of any site for the purposes 
specified must necessarily, to some ex-
tent, be arbitrary.' 
This rule is sustained by the great weight 
of authority. * * * 
The contention that the land cannot be 
condemned because there are other lands further 
away that are available for the purpose sought 
is of no force. * * * 
It is the general rule that, when a corpor-
ation seeks to exercise the right of eminent 
domain, its discretion in the selection of land 
for its use will not be questioned where it acts 
m goocl faith and not capriciously. * * * 
If such were not the rule, the same defense 
could be made with regard to any lands plain-
tiff might seek to condemn. We are clearly 
of the opinion that a necessity ~was shown by re-
spondent for the condemnation of the land. 
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The defendants are not inconvenienced by the tak-
mg (judgment, Abs. 673 to 675, final order, Abs. 682 
to 684). The defendants are of course devoting the 
premises to no use whatever, nor have they any use 
for them except this, that they would like to collect and 
appropriate on rrract D plaintiff's copper solutions from 
plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch if they can succeed 
in blocking plaintiff's effort to do so. Plaintiff does 
not seek to disturb the premises in any manner; every 
right is reserved to defendants except the right in plain-
tiff to preserve plaintiff's own property for plaintiff's 
own use, and the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company 
is in the exclusive possession of the premises anyway. 
Attention is directed to the following provisions of the 
final order of condemnation, which are repeated from 
the judgment: 
It is hereby further Ordered, Adjudged and 
Decreed: 
That plaintiff shall acquire by said taking 
only the rights and easements herein defined, 
and shall not acquire thereby either claim, righf, 
or interest, ownership or trtle in or to any ore'>, 
minerals, waters or other values that may be 
beneath the top of bed-rock beneath said tracts, 
or any right of subjacent or subsurface support. 
That defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., 
shall retain the right in good faith to prospect 
for, mine and remove such orcs, minerals, waters, 
or other values as said defendant shall encounter 
beneath the top of bed-rock beneath the tracts 
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hereby condemned except Tract C, and therein 
beneath plaintiffs catchment facilities, and in 
the course of said mining operations to dump 
upon the surface of all or any of said Tracts 
A, B, C and D whenever and wherever said min-
ing operations shall reasonably require, provided, 
however, that, before any material shall be 
dumped upon said tracts, or any of them, or any 
other or different use be made thereof, said de-
fendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall have 
given plaintiff thirty days' notice in writing of 
such intention, and of the character of use to 
which said premises shall be so subjected, and 
thereupow p,laintiff shall have the right and 
privilege at plaintiff's expense of relocating and 
reconstructing plaintiff's facilities affected there-
by to and upon such other unoccupied tracts of 
land, if any there may be, owned by defendants, 
or any of them, from which no interference shall 
result with the said operations of said defendant 
Stephen Hays Estate, Inc. If the waters or 
solutions on or upwards from the top of bed-
rock, or any part of such waters or solutions, 
shall be intercepted by reason, or in the course, 
of mining operations, plaintiff shall have the 
right to enter such mine workings and there-
from, or by such other method as shall be suit-
alble, repair bed-rock to the end or extent that 
its condition shall be re-es,tablished substantially 
as that in which it presently exists, or by any 
other method continue the collection and diver-
sion of the waters and solutions on top of bed-
rock. Defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall 
retain the further right to make any other use 
of the tracts of land hereby condemned consistent 
with the use thereof for which said tracts are 
hereby acquired. 
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What plaintiff seeks to acquire is of nominal value 
only and no damage can result to defendants, so the 
defendants stipulated that the value of the premises 
condemned, together with the damage to result to the 
balance of defendants' proper'ty by reason of the tak-
ing, was the nominal sum of $500.00, defendants ex-
cluding the copper waters, title to which they claimed. 
~'he substituted diversion facilities defendants pro-
pose are not only prohibitive in expense, but wholly 
impractical and generally unsatisfactory. The evidence 
discloses that always in the collection and diversion of 
the copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps the intakes 
are constructed from beneath bedrock, thence by raises 
through bedrock into or just below the toe of the dump 
the solution from which is desired. The quantity of 
wa~ter encountered immediately upon bedrock varies ac-
cording to the character of the soil or material on bed-
wck at the intake. In Dixon Gulch at plaintiff's in-
take on Tract C very little of the solutions were ob-
tained immediately on bedrock (Tr. 39, 104) because 
the ma!terial at that point was capable of being so com-
pressed by the weight of the railroad fill above that 
it became relatively impervious. The testimony con-
tains many examples of like occurrences beneath other 
dumps. Nevertheless, to be ~:mre that all the copper 
solutions are obtained, the intakes are constructed from 
beneath bedrock to and through the top of bedrock, 
intercepting the solutions on the top of bedrock and 
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upwards. The evidence in this case discloses not a 
single instance wherein any part of the copper solu-
tions sought were beneath the top of bedrock. 
The face of the tunnel or intake proposed by the 
defendant:,; is on the Gardelli placer gravels up Dixon 
Gulch from the railroad fill, and those placer gravels 
were described by Mr. Earl as follows: 
* * * 'rhe rocks in those placer gravels 
would be from, oh, I have seen rocks there from 
three feet long, a foot and a half in diameter, 
many of them; there are a lot of rocks that were 
around six or eight inche:,; in diameter, lots of 
them; I have :,;een many rock:,; there that old 
man Gardelli couldn't lift, and he was a very 
strong man. (Tr. 24:28) That is not unusual. 
There are a lot of those down an old stream bed. 
I would say ;)0 or 40 per cent of the placer 
dump was compo:,;ed of rocks larger than six 
inches in diameter, * * * 
Mr. Christensen similarly described those gravels. 
( Tr. 2100-2103) 
Defendants' proposal IS illustrated by their Ex-
hibit 61. It does not contemplate the collection of 
waters at plaintiff's property line, but instead placing 
the portal of a proposed tunnel at plaintiff's property 
line and collecting the waters four hundred and thirty 
feet or more up the gulch within plaintiff's property. 
The defendants' witness Crocker sponsored this pro-
posal. The face of the tunnel as illustrated upon Ex-
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hibit 61 is at the bottom of plaintiff's dump but on the 
placer gravels. Mr. Crocker testified that there was 
deep wash there, how deep he did not know. 
* * * whether it be twenty or thirty feet 
or more; I should judge it was quite deep. In 
places it might be more than thirty feet. (Tr. 
1395) * * * The gulch widens a little at that 
point so I don't know whether the thickness at 
that point would be thirty or forty feet. I have 
no judgment about it. As to my assuming in 
our Exhibit 61 that bedrock lay within ten feet 
of the natural surface in the bottom of the gulch, 
I did not definitely assume tha!t bedrock lay any-
where at that point. (Tr. 1396) * * * I in-
tended to show on Exhibit 61 this proposed tun-
nel of ours in red as being throughout its course 
in bedrock. I don't know whether bedrock was 
there or thirty feet below there. * * * Sup-
posing that the present face of our tunnel as 
I project it lies thirty feet above bedrock, I 
could not say how far I would expect to continue 
it in order to intercept these waters on bedrock. 
(Tr. 1400) 
The plaintiff's mine engineer, 1\fr. Earl, testified 
as follows with relation to the defendants' proposal: 
Referring to the testimony of defendant's 
witness Crocker and his exhibit in that relation, 
exhibit 61, by which he attempted to suggest 
another method of collecting these waters this 
time on the property line of the Utah Copper 
'Company rather than down in the bottom of 
the gulch, as to whether or not that was a reason-
able practical method of collecting and diverting 
these copper waters,-it is not. (Tr. 2272) I 
might state first my understanding of Mr. Crock-
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er 's testimony did not involve the collecting of 
water on the Utah Copper boundary line or prop-
erty line. Mr. Crocker's testimony as I remem-
ber it was that he was going up above the rail-
road fill and collect the water; that \vould be 
some 200 or 300 feet westerly of the property 
line. The exhibit shows that. (Tr. :2273) To 
begin with, the plan as outlined on exhibit 61 as 
'testified to by Mr. Crocker would not collect all 
of the waters that came from the dump of the Utah 
Copper Oompany, * * * therefore in my 
opinion it would not be feasible from that stand-
point. The reasons it would not collect all of 
the water are that it is not at the toe of the 
Utah Copper dump, it is underneath the dump 
some distance. (Tr. 2275) And furthermore, 
the plan as shown goes about seven or eight feet 
below the bottom of the Dixon Gulch at that 
point. It is my opinion that the gravels are much 
deeper than that at that point, and it would 
be necessary to go considerable depth to shut 
off the water. That if a shut-off were attempted 
at that point it would be necessary to put in 
considerable concrete or some other such con-
struction in order to dam up the water and back 
it up to go into this tunnel. 
I also believe that the water is spread out 
over considerable area at that point and it would 
be necessary to extend the wings way up on the 
side hill, cutting through all of the placer gravels, 
cutting through the banks of the Bingham-Gar-
field Railway fill, because I do not believe, my-
self, this water that comes down the bottom of 
that gulch runs right through underneath-en-
tirely underneath the railway fill. I know from 
my own observation, when the entire waters from 
that gulch came down and did not go through 
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the drain tunnel that it did not come out in any 
one place on the fill. For that remwn, I believe 
it would be necessary to raise up, clear up into 
the fill. 
I also know from my experiPuce in other 
dumps similarly constructed-when I say dumps 
this time I mean Utah Copper Company dumps, 
not railroad fills-that the waters do not always 
flow along the bottom of them. (Tr. 2276) The 
waters percolate laterally as well as perpendi-
cularly downward; I have observed that in half 
a dozen instances where that condition exists. 
Of course I do believe that outside of the waters 
that accumulated below this point, all of the 
water could be collected at this location as given 
by Mr. Crocker. The waters, however, that seep 
below that point, could not he eolleeted; I know 
I would never recommend a thing like this being 
done, because you would never know when you 
were going to be through spending money on 
it. It would be a very difficult thing to maiu-
tain, and expensive to construct originally. I 
don't believe anyone after making a Rtndy and 
knowing the conditionR would ever recommend 
such a construction aR here proposed.. 
Counsel attempt to make much of their cross ex-
amination of Mr. Goodrich in the early stages of the 
case wherein Mr. Goodrich expressed the opinion that 
another tunnel could have been driven for the collect-
ion of these copper solutions at a cost of eight or ten 
thousand dollars, and then described such diversion 
facilities as "being across Hays ground," and as oc-
cupying "practically the entire width of Tract D." 
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( Tr. 385) Mr. Goodrich did not express an opinion as 
to the cost of maintaining such facilities. The defend-
ants' proposal had not been made at that time. This 
was simply a fishing excursion by counsel to pump the 
witness before divulging their plan, and on that ground 
plaintiff's objection was sustained to further cross ex-
amination of that character. Mr. Goodrich was testi-
fying to a facility constructed upon the defendants' 
premises, but even as to such a tunnel this witness 
said: 
From my understanding of the word feasible, 
it would not. Such a tunnel could be construct-
ed, I presume, if anyone had the money and time 
and inclination to do work of that kind. 
and then counsel asked him if a tunnel could not have 
been constructed from Markham Gulch to collect the 
waters of Dixon Gulch, and Mr. Goodrich replied: 
A. Yes sir, it would be possible to drive a 
tunnel from Salt Lake City through the hill 
too. Marham Gulch is over here. The Utah 
Copper operations contemplate the filling of 
Markham Gulch also and the tunnel suggested by 
you, Mr. Rich, I presume would go through m 
Markham Gulch below the steel bridge and drive 
through the mountain across the Hays ground 
into Dixon Gulch. 
Q. As a matter of fact the tunnel would not 
need to go but very little beneath the baE>e of 
your fill, wouldn't it~ 
A. I don't know the tunnel you are tal kwg 
to, it might be ten feet and it might be ten thous-
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and feet. It is such an improbable suggestion 
I would like to know more about what your :dea 
is in answering it. 
and then the court stopped further examination of that 
character as not proper cross examination. 
The costs of producing copper by this process of 
precipitation are not in issue here and no testimony 
has been introduced upon that subject. Counsel volun-
teer conclusions with relation to such costs concerning 
which they have neither knowledge nor information. 
The statement at page 121 of their brief that "prac-
tioally the only cost * * * aside from the slight ex-
pense of precipitation, would be the eight or ten 
thousand dollar * * * cost''- original cost, not 
maintenance- of defendants' proposed substitute facil-
ity. If counsel's volunteering of testimony is to be-
come the vogue, we will say for counsel's information 
·that at the present price of copper plaintiff's production 
of copper by its precipitation process cannot be other-
wise than at a necessary financial loss to plaintiff, al-
though there be no more investment in the Dixon Gulch 
diversion facility than the sum of $500.00. 
If the trial of this case has been prolonged and 
has compelled the employment of technical witnesses at 
great expense, defendants produced that result. When 
plaintiff rested its case there were only 148 pages of 
testimony upon plaintiff's direct examination. That 
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was plaintiff's case. A glance at the record will fix 
the responsibility for this expensive litigation. 
'rherefore, the evidence in this case is that it is 
necessary that plaintiff take the whole Tract D because 
at certain seasons of the year and perhaps at aU seasons 
a part of the copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps 
find their way down Dixon Gulch into and through the 
railroad fill upon that tract, seeping and percolating 
from the fill to the surface and the bedrock beneath, 
thence into the bottom of the gulch and down to Tract 
C and plaintiff's intake. We trust it is apparent from 
the evidence in this case that the only practical way 
in which to collect the copper waters from the plain-
tiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch is that plaintiff has em-
ployed, i. e., their collection at the narrowest point in 
the gulch, being at the toe of the railroad fill. Copper 
water seeping and percolating or flowing laterally 
through the dumps and fill easterly of the wings, raises, 
tunnels, etc., defendants have suggested, would be lost 
by any other method of collection or div,ersion. Also 
defendants' suggestion is impracticable be.cause both 
construction and maintance would be too expensive and 
because it could not be presently ascertained at what 
depth beneath the natural surface upon which the dumps 
rest bedrock could be reached at the boundary line be-
tween the respective properties of the plaintiff and de-
fendants. No doubt, as the defendants' w]tness Crocker 
testified, bedrock would be reached somewhere by the 
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tunnel he proposed, but where even he could not hazard 
an opmwn. Plaintiff is not required to accept such a 
substitute by any law with which we are familiar. 
This is not one of the rare and exceptional cases 
wherein the proposed taking would be unreasonable 
or oppressive, but is squarely within the rule stated in 
2 Lewis Eminent Domain, (3d Ed.) § 604, p. 1068, as 
follows: 
It may be objected that there is no necessity 
of condemning the particular property, because 
some other location might be made or other prop-
erty obtained by agreement. But this objection 
is unavailing. Except as specially restricted by 
the legislature, those invested with the power of 
eminent domain for . a public purpose, can make 
their own location according to their own views 
of what is best or expedient, and this discretion 
cannot be controlled by the courts. 
(G) 
Point 
The court below did not err in awarding costs to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's memorandum in accord with which costs 
were taxed below will be found at page 4073 of the 
judgment roll. It will be observed that no items were 
included to cover filing fees of any character nor the 
service of summons or other papers, nor annual prem-
iums upon the surety bond required of plaintiff upon 
the order for immediate occupation, but that instead the 
only costs taxed were witnesses' per diem and mileage 
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necessitated by defendants' effort to obtain a judgment 
in their favor upon the issue of title to the copper solu-
tions, an 'issue that defendants, not the plaintiff, in-
jected into this suit. Defendants' counsel at the outset 
made it very clear that, in their conception of this suit, 
it was merely a title action. The following is an ex-
cerpt from a discussion between court and counsel: (Tr. 
11 to 18). 
MR. P AR80NS: It is my understanding 
that the hearing will proceed and we will be 
limited as your Honor will be limited to the three 
statutory questions. 
MR. RICH: Do I understand we will be de-
prived of a jury trial on the question of de-
termining title? 
* ;; * 
MR. PARSONS. My notion about this is 
our opponents are entitled to a jury trial only 
upon one question, that is the ques6on of dam-
ages, the value of the right-of-way and the 
damage to the balance of the larger tract due to 
the taking. The question of the t~tle to the water 
I think goes to our right to condemn. That 
question must be determined by the court. If 
we do not own that water I do not know very 
well how we could take theirs. 
* * * 
MR. PARSONS: It is our intention to in-
troduce evidence upon the three preliminary 
questions provided by statute for the determina-
tion of the court. I think we enumerated those 
this morning, so you know what ones I refer to. 
MR. RICH: You indicated that title was 
one of them1 
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MR. PARSONS: Our right to condemn. 
MR. RICH: Your right to condemn, but 
the extent of condemnation, thrut is, the title to 
this water is the thing that is, as counsel says, 
and as I have said, the paramount issue here. 
That is not one of the three things, at all. 
* * * 
So far as the three things here are concerned, 
they don't amount to anything, absolutely don't 
amount to anything, 
Again upon the occasion of defendants' motion for 
non-suit (Tr. 740), defendants' counsel defined the 
character of this suit as follows: 
This suit is not a condemnation suit, but 
is a suit to obtain title to property. There is no 
question about that, at all. 
That issue the defendants injected into this case 
and therein failed. Plaintiff in this action has not con-
demned, and cannot be made to condemn, copper waters 
or solutions, and consequently cannot be subjected to a 
judgment for the value of such waters or solutions. 
Plaintiff has been consistent always in its position that 
it seeks no waters or solutions, and cannot be made to 
take any waters or solutions it does not already own. 
The judgment against plaintiff can be only the amount 
stipulated. It is not buying copper waters or solutions. 
Defendants resist the taxation of costs against 
them on the ground that in a condemnation suit, al-
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though it be as they define it, merely ''a smoke screen'' 
( Tr. 7 40) to a title action, they are at liberty to inject 
into the issues and to try out any fantastic theory not 
germane to the action, of which they may conceive, 
and although completely defeated, nevertheless tax 
against plaintiff the costs they have thereby incurred, 
that were it not so, defendants would be deprived of 
the protection Section 22 of Article I of the Constitution 
of Utah is designed to afford. The constitutional pro-
vision was not designed to secure to an unsuccessful 
litigant in a title action the costs incurred by him in 
unsuccessfully trying out groundless claims of title. 
Neither constitution nor statute was framed for the 
purpose of permitting an unsuccessful claimant to sub-
ject his successful adversary to the expense not only 
of defending litigation brought by the first, devoid of 
merit, but also to the payment of the costs the first had 
incurred in trying out his erroneous theories, in other 
words, to permit the unsuccessful party to experiment 
at the risk and certain expense of the successful party 
to that litigation! 
The costs taxed were not incurred in ascertaining 
the amount of the compensation to which the owner was 
entitled by reason of the taking; that amount was stipu-
lated at the sum of $500.00, which was the amount 
offered defendants by plaintiff before the suit had been 
commenced. (Tr. 3874) Had the defendants not con-
ceived the idea of resorting to this effort to quiet in 
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them title to the copper solutions on and above bedrock 
from plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch, this suit no 
doubt would never have heen instituted. Upon the 
matter of compensation for the premises condemned 
and damages resulting from the taking, the parties were 
never apart. Plaintiff always insisted, and the plea,d-
ings clearly show, that plaintiff was condemning no 
waters or copper solutions, and that if permitted to 
take its judgment as prayed defendants by a subsequent 
action, could have enjoined plaintiff's diversion of solu-
tions or waters of which plaintiff was not the owner. 
Defendants, however, elected to and did by their several 
answers, make the effort in this condemnation suit, to 
try title to the copper solutions plaintiff proposed to 
collect. Had defendants not so elected and had they 
not instituted another action against this plaintiff to 
quiet title in them to these solutions and for injunctive 
relief, as defendants might properly have done, and 
have been unsuccessful in that action as here, of course 
,this plaintiff would in that action have been allowed its 
costs. The case at bar indeed became a title suit, but 
it was the defendants who made it such. The defend-
ants failed, and notwithstanding, they seek not only 
to require the successful party to pay its own costs, 
but theirs as well. That is straining the constitutional 
provision too far. 
In other words, the issue that was tried in this 
case was not one in condemnation, but instead one of 
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title to copper solutions for the collection and diversion 
of which plaintiff sought to exercise the right of eminent 
domain. The Colorado ,Supreme Court emphasizes the 
distinction in Haver vs. Matonock, 75 Colo. 301, 225 
Pac. 834. The plaintiff in that case sought to con-
demn a right of way for a pipe line for the conveyance 
of water from a stated source for the irrigation of his 
land, but the defendant answered the complaint and 
denied that there was any water available for plaintiff 
at that source, and hence denied that there was any 
necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain. The trial court dismissed the proceeding ac-
cordingly, but upon appeal the supreme court held: 
We cannot hold that the question of necessity 
involves the question whether there is any water 
in existence which petitioners can use. * * * 
The views above expressed are supported by the 
langauge of the opinion in Gibson v. Cann, 28 
Colo. 499, 66 Pac. 879, where it was said that--
'In determining the question of neces-
ity for taking lands sought to be condemn-
ed for right of way for irrigating ditches, 
* * * the question as to * * * 
what petitioner may be .able to accomplish 
in the way of obtaining water which can 
be utilized through his proposed ditch, 
* * * cannot be inquired into.' 
In Schneider v. Schenider, 36 Colo. 518, 86 
Pac. 347, this court, in considering the question 
of necessity for the construction of a ditch for 
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which it was sought to condemn a right of way, 
said: 
'As to whether or not there is suffi-
cient water for plaintiff's use, or as to 
whether or not the plan is a practicable 
or feasible one, is a matter which cannot 
be determined in a proceeding of this 
character-( citing Gibson v. Cann, supra). 
'The various questions which may 
arise as to the right to appropriate the 
water cannot be here determined. * * *' 
lf'urther on, the court said : 
'Appellant contends that a nonsuit 
should have heen granted hecause plain-
tiff failed to prove that she was the owner 
of a water right or had made an appropri-
ation of water. We are not inclined to 
concede this contention. An action under 
the Eminent Domain Act cannot be con-
verted into an action to quiet title. So 
far as it is concerned it must remain an 
action in eminent domain, and no issue 
can be injected into the case which will 
change its character. D. P. & I. Co. v. 
D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 30 Colo. 215.' 
The evidence presented by defendant before 
the commissioners for the purpose of disproving 
necessity was not, for reasons above indicated, 
relevant to the question of necessity, as that 
term is used in proceedings of this kind. There 
was, in fact, no competent evidence to show ab-
sence of necessity. It was error not to set aside 
the findings of the commission, because there 
was no evidence on which the findings could be 
based. 
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The judgment is reversed, and the cause re-
manded, for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with the views herein expressed. (225 Pac. 834-5) 
To the same effect is Publi'c Service Co. vs. City of 
Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 Pac. 493. That plaintiff 
did not object to the trial in this action of the iS'sue 
of title raised by defendants renders the issue no less 
distinct, no less separate and apar.t from that of eminent 
domain, no less an issue wherein the defeated parties 
should in good conscience and in law suffer a judg-
ment against them for taxable costs. 
Section 7347 Compiled Laws of Utah 19H upon 
this subject is as follows: 
Costs may be allowed or not, and if allowed, 
may be be apportioned between the parties on 
the same or adverse sides, in the discretion of the 
court. 
That section is not meaningless. 
In Truckee River General Electric Co. v. Durham, 
38 Nev. 311, 149 Pac. 61, the court had the following 
to say upon this subject : 
Appellant complains of the order of the 
court in assessing all of the costs of the proceed-
ings to it. It is our opinion that in assessing 
costs in these proceedings the court should take 
into consideration the reasonableness of the valu-
ation placed upon the land by the defendant in 
his answer and the amount of damages claimed. 
If the demand is so unreasonable as to justify 
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a fair-minded person in litigating the question, 
small consideration should be paid to his request 
for judgment for the eosts which accrued after 
the filing of the answer in the case. 
The defendants in their answer alleged they were 
damaged by the taking in an amount "upwards of 
$200,000.00,'' but before this suit was instituted plain-
tiff offered them $500.00 in full of the value of the 
premises ·taken and all damages sustained by them, 
and at the conclusion of this extended litigation the de-
fendants stipulated for a judgment for that identical 
amount. Defendants still insist that the copper solu-
tions are worth "upwards of $200,000.00," but plaintiff 
is not seeking to condemn copper solutions, could not 
do so in this action even if it wanted to, and could 
not in this action be subjected to a judgment on that 
account. The stipulated amount of $500.00 covers the 
premises taken and the damage sustained. Plaintiff 
seeks nothing else. The nature of this suit cannot be 
changed by the purported defense alleged in the answer 
to gratify defendants' desire for a large judgment. 
Defendants have received the full amount for which 
they stipulated, hence an adequate compensation for all 
property taken and the damages sustained, including 
all costs of suit upon that issue, and there can be no 
violation of constitutional provisions by requiring de-
fendants to pay the taxable costs resulting from their 
unsuccessful effort to quiet title in them to other prop-
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erty beyond the scope of this suit, the taking of which 
would be impossible through or by means of this suit. 
Determination of title to the copper solutions was 
not a necessary incident of this suit-no more so than 
an inquiry into the precise nature of plaintiff's title 
in or to its dumps in Dixon Gulch, nor into the many 
other matters the courts have excluded from cons.ider-
ation in condemnation suits. 
In re Cedar Rapids, 85 la. 39, 51 N. W. 1142; 
Mercer Co. v. Wolff, 237 Ill. 74; 
Chicago v. Sanitary Dist., 272 Ill. 37, 111 
N. g_ 491; 
Dallas v. Hallock, 44 Ore. 246, 75 Pac. 204; 
State v. Superior Ct., 42 Wash. 521, 85 Pac. 
256; 
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. Birmingham 
So. Ry. Co., 128 Ala. 526, 29 So. 455; 
Santa Ana v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 234, 64 Pac. 
287; 
Richland School 'rp. v. Overmeyer, 164 Ind. 
382, 73 N. E. 811; 
Kansas etc. Ry. Co. v. N. W. Coal & Min. 
Co., 161 Mo. 288, 61 S. W. 684, 84 Am. 
St. Rep. 717, 51 L. R. A. 936; 
Caretta Ry. Co. v. V a-Pocahontas Coal Co. 
62 W. V a. 185, 57 S. E. 401; 
This suit was one to condemn Tract D on and 
above bedrock as a conduit by means of which to con-
vey to plaintiff's intake on Tract C the copper solu-
tions from the dumps above in Dixon Gulch, and the 
parties stipulated the value of the premises taken and 
the damages to result from that taking. Had defend-
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ants not elected, and the plaintiff not permitted defend-
ants, to try out in this action the question of title 
to the copper solutions flowing at the so-called Hays 
Spring, the condemnation suit would have been com-
pletely disposed of by that stipulation. If defendants 
thereafter concluded plaintiff was taking defendants' 
copper solutions, the judgment in the condemnation suit 
would not have been res adjudicata upon the issue of 
title, because the latter was not within the issues in the 
condemnation suit. No constitutional provision is vio-
lated by the taxation of costs in favor of the successful 
party to an action to try title, and accordingly no 
error was committed by the court below in taxing such 
costs upon the trial of that issue below. The issue re-
mains the same whether injected into a condemnation 
suit or tried in a separate action. 
Somewhat this situation arose in the case of Matter 
of Cortland, etc., Horse R. R. Co., ns N. Y. 363, wherein 
the facts were these: one railroad company attempted to 
condemn a crossing over the tracks of another rail-
road company. The two companies were represented 
by eminent counsel and the case was long and bitterly 
fought upon the question of the right to condemn, the mat-
ter of damage being, as here, of no especial moment. The 
court allowed costs in favor of the condemner, holding 
that no constitutional provision had been violated by 
such award because the defendant had not been de-
prived of a fair compensation for what was taken. 
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The quantum of damage had not been the issue tried and 
consequently the case of Matter of Walsh, 94 N.Y. 287, 
did not apply. The court held: 
The application in this case was a special 
proceeding (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 3333, 3334), and 
according to the general rule the costs were in the 
discretion of the court ( §3240). The claim that 
the proceeding having been instituted by the pe-
titioner to acquire a crossing over the track of the 
appellant, the latter could not be compelled to 
pay the cost of the proceeding, under the decision 
in Matter of Walsh (94 N. Y. 287), is not well 
founded. * * * The case shows that the ap-
pellant in substance declined to permit the pe-
titioner to cross its tracks, and when the com-
missioners were appointed, the question litigated 
before them related to the place and manner of 
crossing, whether it should be at, or above, or 
below grade, and not at all to the question of 
compensation, as to which no evidence was given. 
'.l_1he points of crossing considered by the commis-
sioners, and as to which the evidence related, 
were a crossing on the highway and one outside 
of the highway but near to it, and there was no 
practical difficulty in giving evidence bearing 
upon the amount of compensation, if that question 
was deemed important. 
Upou the facts presented to the court on the 
motion in respect to costs, the court would have 
been justified in finding that the appellant, on 
the hearing before the commissi,oners, waived aU 
claim for compensation beyond nominal damages. 
The litigation, from the first, has been most de-
termined and persistent; on the one side to se-
cure, and on the other to prevent a crossing as 
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desired by the respondent. 'rhere is no consti-
tutional right involved in the oruer of the Special 
Term imposing the costs of the litigation upon 
the appellant, and we cannot review its discre-
tion. * * * 
Costs of the condemning party on appeal by the 
property owner may be allowed against the owner. 
City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & 
Mill Co., 172 Cal. 332, 156 Pac. 468; 
Town of Redmond v. Perrigo, 84 Wash. 407, 
146 Pac. 838. 
CONCLUSION 
As this question has been passed upon adversely 
to the defendants by two judges of the court below, 
first, by the late Morris L. Ritchie, and then the Honor-
able Roger I. McDonough, and is now brought here by 
the defendants for a third consideration. 
One is not greatly impressed by defendants' resist-
ance, the only object of which is to enrich themselves 
by the seizure of plaintiff's copper solutions, an artificial 
product resulting from plaintiff's industry and invest-
ment, from the conduct of plaintiff's leaching operations 
upon plaintiff's premises, a product every ingredient 
of which is the absolute property of the plaintiff. De-
fendants seek the aid of this court by which to accomp-
lish that seizure. They make a very strenuous effort 
to persuade this court to deny plaintiff the right to 
convey its solutions across defendants' premises, that 
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defendants may appropriate them. They urge upon this 
court authority to the effect that "when the oil left the 
land of the opera tors it became abandoned property," 
(page 39 Appellants' Brief) defendants claiming these 
solutions upon that theory, yet by the same effort seek-
ing to prevent plaintiff's condemnation sought by this 
action whereby to avoid such an abandonment. If 
plaintiff ~be permitted to condemn the easement sought, 
the authorities cited by defendants will be in no manner 
relevant. As did the defendants in the case of Utah 
Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining 
Oo., so do the defendants in the case at bar, strive 
strenuously to defeat plaintiff's effort to condemn the 
easement necessary t~o prevent the escape and loss of 
plaintiff's solutions, thus to insure plaintiff's abandon-
ment of its solutions and the successful consummation 
of defendants' effort to acquire them. The defendants, 
willfully it seems to us, refuse to admit the purpose 
for which this action is brought. If plaintiff be per-
mitted to eondemn, plaintiff's solutions will be saved 
to plaintiff, not abandoned by it. In their effort to 
defeat the condemnation and thereby accomplish the 
abandonment defendants require, defendants assume 
the abandonment the maintenance of this suit will avoid, 
a false assumption upon which defendants attempt to 
erect a defense. 
Pending the action the copper solutions have been 
saved fr,om abandonment by order of court putting 
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plaintiff in possession for the purpose of conveying 
plaintiff's copper solutions across Tract D to and into 
plaintiff's intake, by which order plaintiff's boundary 
line was, pending the action, extended across Tract D to 
and including plaintiff's intake. These solutions are 
concededly plaintiff's at plaintiff's boundary line, and 
if plaintiff be permitted to condemn this channel across 
Tract D to plaintiff's intake, plaintiff's boundary line 
will cease as such and those solutions will have flowed, 
seeped or percolated along the course wherein plaintiff 
shall have acquired the right, ,title and easement so to 
conduct them; they will never have passed beyond plain-
tiff's estate, will never have escaped from plaintiff's 
possession, will never have ceased to be captured, collect-
ed, impounded and preserved by plaintiff within this 
well-known and defined channel to plaintiff's intake, a 
channel as well known and clearly defined as the very 
pipe line into which the solutions flow at plaintiff's 
intake and by which they are conveyed to plaintiff's 
precipitating plant. Predicated as it is upon the errone-
ous assumption that plaintiff's solutions have been 
abandoned, defendant's argument has no relevancy what-
ever to the case at bar. 
The judgment below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DrcKsoN, ELLrs, PARSONS & McCREA, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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